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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS, AND THE CHOICE OF LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS AND WARS
John C. Dehn †

After over fourteen years of continuous armed conflict, neither courts nor
commentators are closer to a common understanding of how, or the extent to which,
international and U.S. law interact to regulate acts of belligerency by the United
States. This Article articulates and defends the first normative theory regarding the
general relationship of customary international law to the U.S. legal system that fully
harmonizes Supreme Court precedent. It then applies this theory to customary
international laws of war to articulate the legal framework regulating the armed
conflicts of the United States. It demonstrates that the relationship of customary
international law to U.S. law differs in cases involving war and other exercises of
“external” sovereign powers from cases involving “internal” powers of domestic
governance. In cases involving the exercise of external sovereignty, including
sovereign powers of war, the Supreme Court traditionally applied customary
international law as an exogenous, nonfederal rule of decision. The Court articulated
this “external” choice-of-law framework in Paquete Habana: “[W]here there is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.” 1 The Article then examines
the Court’s wartime and related jurisprudence in order to more thoroughly explicate
the Paquete Habana framework in the context of armed conflicts, demonstrating the
Court’s apparent understanding of the relationship of international laws of war to
the Constitution and laws of the United States. This analysis not only confirms the
Article’s general customary international law thesis, but also clarifies important
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implications of the Court’s use of international law as an exogenous rule of decision,
importantly, that such rules need not be consistent with the Constitution’s separation
of domestic powers or the Bill of Rights. Given the range of issues this Article clarifies,
it should influence academic and judicial discourse regarding the relationship of
customary international to U.S. law, particularly in cases involving the armed
conflicts of the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the Obama administration once hoped to bring an end to
the armed conflicts that began with the attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), 2 circumstances have changed, and armed conflict with Islamist
armed groups in foreign lands continue indefinitely. 3 Yet, after more
than fourteen years of armed conflict with such groups, neither courts
nor commentators have a common understanding of how, or the extent
to which, international and U.S. law interact to regulate acts of war by
the United States. There are two central issues. The first is whether U.S.
courts may apply customary or conventional international laws of war
to constrain acts undertaken by the executive branch in armed conflict.
If so, the next issue is whether international law provides only
interpretive guidance for any applicable legislation or whether it
provides a rule of decision in U.S. courts, either as federal common law
or otherwise.
For example, in the 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 4 a plurality of
the Supreme Court interpreted the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF)5 to encompass the power to detain a putative
enemy belligerent indefinitely—even a U.S. citizen—notwithstanding a
general statutory prohibition of executive detention without
congressional authorization. 6 A plurality found this power to be a
fundamental aspect of war permitted by international laws of war and
therefore clearly, though impliedly, authorized by the post-9/11 AUMF. 7
In 2010, however, two members of a three-judge panel of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) concluded
that international law is irrelevant to interpreting the scope of AUMF
detention authority unless Congress affirmatively indicates otherwise. 8
2 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university).
3 President Barack Obama, Statement on ISIL (Sept. 10, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1).
4 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
5 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
6 See Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012)); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–19.
7 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (“We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the
limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.” (quoting
AUMF § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224)).
8 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[Defendant’s]
arguments . . . rely heavily on the premise that the war powers granted by the AUMF and other
statutes are limited by the international laws of war. This premise is mistaken. There is no
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When denying en banc rehearing of this decision, several judges
separately announced their belief that the panel’s statements about the
relevance of international law were not essential to its decision on the
merits. 9 In response, one panel member sharply contested that view,
arguing the panel’s opinion was binding precedent on the issue. 10
Another argued at length that federal courts could not use international
law as either a rule of decision or an interpretive aid without clear
legislative intent to observe or incorporate it. 11 He asserted that neither
the Geneva Conventions of 1949—to which the United States and most
nations are party 12—nor customary international laws of war are
inherently enforceable in the courts of the United States. 13
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the independent
force or effect of customary or conventional international laws of war in
the nation’s courts for more than a century. 14 In Hamdi, international
law clearly provided only interpretive guidance for determining the
particular “military force” authorized by the post-9/11 AUMF. 15 In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that President Bush’s military
indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, or the MCA of 2006 or 2009, that
Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for
the President’s war powers under the AUMF. The international laws of war as a whole have not
been implemented domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for
U.S. courts.” (citation omitted)).
9 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., concurring) (“We
decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in
interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”).
10 Id. at 2–4 (Brown, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 22–53 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
12 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. There are 196 states party to these
conventions. For a complete account, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO
THE FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES 6
(2016).
13 Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he 1949 Geneva Conventions
are not self-executing treaties and thus are not domestic U.S. law.”); id. at 23 (“[A]bsent
incorporation into a statute or a self-executing treaty, such customary-international-law
principles are not part of the domestic law of the United States that is enforceable in federal
court.”).
14 After a review of the relevant case law, the case appears to have been Herrera v. United
States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912). Prior to Hamdi, the Court addressed the law of war as authority for
the use of military commissions in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 20 (1946), and Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361–62 (1952). See discussion infra Section
IV.B.3. However, in each case the Court noted that Congress had expressly authorized the
tribunals at issue in Articles of War.
15 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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commissions order 16 violated applicable international law due to a
perceived conflict with a provision of what is known as “Common
Article 3” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 17 When doing so,
however, the Court found that a federal statute authorizing the use of
military commissions required compliance with Common Article 3, not
that the treaty provided a rule of decision. 18 Neither opinion, therefore,
squarely addressed the inherent applicability of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions or any related customary international law in the courts of
the United States.
The lack of a uniform judicial approach to or understanding of the
relationship of international to U.S. law echoes even broader and more
diverse disagreement in legal commentary. With regard to treaties,
disagreements largely focus on the circumstances under which treaty
provisions should be deemed “self-executing,” and therefore “supreme
federal law” enforceable in U.S. courts. 19 Some commentators have
argued that Article VI of the Constitution, which declares treaties to be
“supreme Law of the Land,” 20 establishes a presumption that treaties are
self-executing and preemptive federal law subject to limited

16 Military Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
17 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). The term “Common Article 3” refers to the
fact that Article 3 is identical in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, supra note 12; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 12; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 12;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 12.
18 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628 (holding that “regardless of the nature of the rights conferred
on Hamdan [by the Geneva Conventions of 1949], they are . . . part of the law of war” with
which 10 U.S.C. § 821 requires compliance (citation omitted)). Prior to the Military
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 821 stated only: “The provisions of this
chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals.” 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000); see Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 4, § 821, 120 Stat. 2600; see also Military Commissions Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 1801, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574. Thus, the Court essentially held that
§ 821 “executed” the entirety of the law of war relevant to military commissions. Hamdan, 548
U.S. 557.
19 For a description of the doctrine, see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)
(“Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision.”), overruled in part on other grounds by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). This was later referred to as a “self-executing”
treaty. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116,
120 (1887).
20 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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exceptions. 21 Conversely, the Supreme Court more recently held that
unless a treaty “conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing,’” it is not
“federal law.” 22 This appears to effectively establish a presumption
against self-execution. 23 The lower courts have grappled with selfexecution doctrine for roughly two centuries without developing a
uniform understanding of its exact content or precise application. 24
Although there are a number of important treaties that contain
international laws of war, their most important provisions are widely
understood to be customary international law applicable in both
international and noninternational armed conflicts. 25 For brevity,
therefore, this article will obliquely deal with treaties as an aspect of the
Supreme Court’s choice-of-law framework and eschew a more
exhaustive theoretical examination of them.
Commentary regarding the relationship of customary international
law to the U.S. legal system is more diverse. The so-called “modern”
position is that customary international law is generally adopted as
supreme federal common law binding upon both state and federal
courts. 26 The “revisionist” view asserts that customary international law
21 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed.
1996); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 602 (2008).
22 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 446–49
(2000) (arguing that government clearly has power to make non-self-executing treaties); David
H. Moore, Response, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 32 (2009) (arguing that a presumption of treaty self-execution is unnecessary
and inconsistent with treaty-making power).
23 See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 546 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority opinion
“erects ‘clear statement’ presumptions” against self-execution); id. at 533 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (characterizing the majority opinion as creating “a presumption against selfexecution”).
24 See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) (reviewing varied approaches by U.S. courts to self-execution
doctrine).
25 See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175 (2005) (explaining an International Committee of the Red Cross
customary international law study and listing 161 putative rules of customary international law,
most of which apply to both international and noninternational armed conflict). But see OFFICE
OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 30 (2015)
(“In most cases, treaty provisions do not reflect customary international law. . . . In some cases,
a treaty provision may reflect customary international law. . . . A treaty provision may be based
on an underlying principle that is an accepted part of customary law, but the precise language
of the treaty provision may not reflect customary international law because there may be
considerable disagreement . . . .”).
26 See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth
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is “general law” that takes effect in the U.S. legal system only when
federal statutes, or state courts or legislatures, affirmatively enact or
incorporate it. 27 This approach relies heavily on the Constitution’s
allocation of domestic lawmaking powers and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Erie v. Tompkins. 28 Erie held that “[t]here is no federal
general common law,” and that state law provides the rule of decision in
federal courts “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congress” 29 as required by the Rules of Decision Act. 30
Because “[n]either the modern position nor the revisionist position
fully accounts for the role that the traditional law of nations has played
in the U.S. constitutional system,” 31 commentators have developed
additional approaches. Some assert that customary international law is
“general law” that may provide a rule of decision in U.S. courts absent
an applicable federal law, but do not clarify the full range of situations to
which this doctrine would apply. 32 Other commentary argues that the
federal courts may create federal common law from customary
international law in order to preserve the foreign affairs powers of the
elected branches. 33 More recent commentary argues that customary
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).
27 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
28 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 Id. at 78.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts—
Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807, 810 (1998) (“[C]ustomary international
law’s purported status today . . . is . . . in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.”).
31 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98
VA. L. REV. 729, 743 (2012).
32 MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 342–61 (2007)
(asserting that the law of nations may provide “a rule of decision, so long as it does not displace
otherwise-constitutional state or federal law”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate over
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 369–70 (2002) (arguing customary
international law is neither state nor federal law, but “general” law that “would remain available
for both state and federal courts to apply in appropriate cases as determined by traditional
principles of the conflict of laws”).
33 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“Taken in historical context, the best reading of Supreme Court
precedent . . . is that the law of nations does not apply as preemptive federal law by virtue of
any general Article III power to fashion federal common law, but only when necessary to
preserve and implement distinct Article I and Article II powers . . . .”); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Comment, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 513, 536 (2002) (finding judicial power “to make federal common law interstitially in
the area of foreign affairs to serve important federal interests”).
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international law should be considered “nonpreemptive, nonfederal”
law applicable in federal, but not necessarily state, courts, 34 and other
commentary argues that Articles I and II of the Constitution sometimes
require courts to apply international law, making it a form of
constitutional law. 35 Bringing matters full circle, a recent article provides
a slightly qualified defense of the modern position and critiques the
revisionist and several other “intermediate” positions. 36
A significant problem with much of this scholarship is that it does
not distinguish among several very different types of contemporary
customary international law. The most common type of customary
international law, and the one central to this Article, is what I will refer
to as the “inter-nation-state law of nations” or “traditional international
law.” 37 Traditional international law creates primary rights and
obligations between nation-states as well as their respective citizens.38 It
leaves matters of internal governance and private rights to the
independent judgment of each nation-state. As will be later shown,
“traditional international law” was by far the most prominent focus of
international law, then known as the “law of nations,” at the time the
Constitution was adopted and long thereafter. 39
An unrelated type of contemporary international law is what I term
“internal human rights law”—what others have called “modern
sovereignty-limiting rules.” 40 Internal human rights law purports to
create international legal rights and obligations between a nation-state
and its citizens or others within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction and control, matters traditionally within the unfettered
discretion of each sovereign nation-state. 41 To the extent that
34 T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91,
97–100 (2004).
35 See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 31.
36 See generally Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of
the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011).
37 Jeremy Bentham coined the term “international law” in 1789 and defined it as the law
applicable between states. See M.W. Janis, Comment, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of
“International Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408–09 (1984).
38 I use the word “primary” in the sense that H.L.A. Hart used it, referring to a conductregulating rule, and distinguish it from what Hart called “secondary” rules of “recognition,”
“change,” and “adjudication” that govern how primary rules are established, altered, and
enforced. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
39 See infra Section II.A.
40 Bellia & Clark, supra note 31, at 744.
41 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 2(1), Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”). For a “rough picture of the [human rights]
landscape,” see Eric A. Posner, Essay, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
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international human rights norms or instruments create rights and
obligations between nation-states and foreign nations or peoples—a
hotly contested issue—they fall within the scope of traditional
international law. 42 International law that purports to create primary
rights and obligations between a state and its population is properly
understood as internal human rights law. The interference of this law
with traditional understandings of state sovereignty and internal
governance make it functionally distinct from traditional international
law, and therefore deserving of separate theoretical treatment. 43
Further adding to the confusion is the fact that the term “law of
nations” was understood to encompass various “branches,” some of
which were indeed “general” law applicable between or among
individuals or commercial entities rather than states. 44 For example, the
lex mercatoria, or law merchant, was a general commercial law
considered a branch of the law of nations. 45 As the concept of the law of
nations evolved post-Westphalia, however, commercial law came to be
viewed by prominent jurists and the Supreme Court as “general” rather
than “international” law. 46
This Article demonstrates that a state-to-state and positivist
understanding of the “law of nations” developed in the works of jurists,
and is evident in the decisions of the Supreme Court much earlier than
is generally acknowledged. Commentary that combines all traditional
branches of the law of nations together with contemporary internal
human rights law for identical theoretical treatment rather than

1758, 1764 (2008). For a collection of all human rights declarations and covenants, see Chapter
IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited June 13, 2016).
42 See, e.g., Beth van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application
of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20, 28 (2014)
(surveying the range of possible ICCPR interpretations, including those that would create
human rights obligations between signatories and foreign nationals under their “effective
control”).
43 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 31, at 744 (“The modern position would treat all
customary international law—including modern sovereignty-limiting rules—as self-executing
federal common law applicable in state and federal courts. In some cases, however, this
approach would undermine rather than further the Constitution’s allocation of powers.”).
44 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27.
45 David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the
Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE 7, 27–28 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011)
(noting law merchant part of general common law).
46 See infra Part II. But see Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 45, at 27 (“[M]any
commercial and maritime laws identified as general law were also sometimes described as
branches of the law of nations.”).
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separately analyzing each according to its purpose and function, is
fundamentally flawed. 47
This Article first addresses the general relationship of traditional
customary international law to the U.S. legal system, and then examines
its specific application in cases involving armed conflicts with foreign
entities. It reviews key developments in the Western understanding of
the “law of nations,” clear inferences from the text of the Constitution
and First Judiciary Act, as well as Supreme Court precedent and early
American legal commentary to demonstrate that the Constitution’s
Framers, First Congress, and early judges and jurists generally
understood customary international law to be exogenous to the U.S.
legal system but nevertheless inherently applicable to the United States
and in its courts. It proposes a more nuanced theory of international law
and rules of decision that distinguishes cases involving the exercise of
“internal” sovereign powers of domestic governance from those
involving the exercise of “external” sovereign powers. It concludes that
in cases involving the exercise of external sovereign powers, such as
foreign war powers, the Supreme Court applied international law as a
nonfederal rule of decision. The Court articulated its constitutionally
based choice-of-law framework in Paquete Habana: “[W]here there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.”48
The Article then analyzes the Court’s decisions adjudicating the
lawfulness of acts undertaken by the United States during armed
conflict with foreign nations or groups. This analysis more thoroughly
elucidates the Paquete Habana framework and the relationship of
international laws of war to the Constitution, including the Bill of
Rights, and federal statutes. It distinguishes such cases from those that
involve the exercise of internal sovereign powers incident to war, as well
as the extraterritorial exercise of what are typically internal sovereign
powers over citizens abroad in times of peace. Unlike scholarship
suggesting a conflict-of-laws approach to customary international law
generally without clarifying its exact parameters or demonstrating its
actual use by the Supreme Court, 49 this Article provides a more
thorough explication of the Court’s traditional choice of law in matters
involving external sovereignty.

47 See, e.g., Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 45, at 27–28 (using the Court’s approach to
law merchant in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), to argue the general proposition that
all law of nations branches are general law).
48 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
49 See sources cited supra note 32.
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The Article has five parts. Part I briefly reviews the main thrust and
assumption of contemporary commentary regarding the general
relationship of customary international law to the U.S. legal system to
identify a key assumption underlying the theories advanced: that
customary international law is properly considered a natural-law-based
“general law” rather than positivist law “enacted” by express or implied
state consent. Part II retraces the jurisprudential development of the
“law of nations” to demonstrate that by the time the Constitution was
ratified, the term “law of nations” referred primarily to customary
norms and treaties enacted by nation-states and binding inter se
between consenting nations and, derivatively, their respective citizens.
Part II also demonstrates that the Constitution’s text, certain acts of the
First Congress, nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions, and early
American legal commentary all support the view that the inter-nationstate law of nations was largely exogenous, positivist law rather than a
theoretical “general law” or a “federal common law.” It also proposes the
constitutional basis for applying this exogenous law as a rule of decision
in U.S. courts. Part III explains why the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie does not preclude resort to customary international law as a rule of
decision in federal courts, and proposes and justifies a functional
approach to the categorization of rules of decision based upon whether
the government is exercising powers of internal or external sovereignty.
Part IV more closely examines the Supreme Court’s approach to
customary international law in cases involving belligerent acts in armed
conflict, explaining the contours of the Paquete Habana framework. It
also identifies and explains key differences in the Court’s understanding
of separation of powers and Bill of Rights issues in this context from
those related to matters of internal governance. Finally, Part V briefly
suggests how this more nuanced understanding of the interaction
between international and domestic law affects certain overarching
doctrinal issues as well as specific contemporary legal issues.
This Article clarifies that, in appropriate cases, customary
international law provides an obligatory, exogenous rule of decision for
U.S. courts in the absence of a treaty or controlling legislative or
executive act. Therefore, courts must identify and apply customary
international norms in cases adjudicating an exercise of the nation’s war
powers. Any potential constitutional “gloss” 50 from recent claims of
plenary presidential power to violate international law should be eyed
with suspicion. 51 This is particularly so in light of recent scholarship
50 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
51 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 412 (2012) (“It has become apparent from political science scholarship,
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noting the Executive’s self-serving approach to legal interpretation 52 and
tendency to adhere to even constitutionally questionable internal
executive branch “precedent.” 53 In other words, neither courts nor
scholars should interpret politically motivated congressional abdication
of its responsibilities or exigency-driven executive overreach54 to
represent either branch’s true understanding of the Constitution’s
allocation of powers or the relevance of international law to their
exercise.
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMENTARY
Customary international law is generally understood to arise “from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation.” 55 In 1987, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law adopted the position that customary “[i]nternational law
and international agreements of the United States are law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several States.” 56 Proponents of
this position often rely on the so-called “canonical” statement of the
Supreme Court in Paquete Habana that “[i]nternational law is part of
our law.” 57 A federal circuit court declared, “[t]he law of nations forms
an integral part of the [general] common law, and . . . became a part of
the common law of the United States upon the adoption of the
however, that the Madisonian [interbranch competition to preserve constitutional power]
model does not accurately reflect the dynamics of modern congressional-executive relations.”).
52 See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006) (arguing that the executive branch properly uses constitutional
avoidance doctrine in its internal legal interpretation to “defend” its powers and limit effect of
laws enacted by Congress).
53 See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (arguing it is appropriate for the executive branch to follow its
internal legal precedent, even if constitutionally questionable).
54 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 37 (paperback ed. 2009) (stating that “lawyers and Attorneys General
over many decades,” for presidents of both parties, are “driven by the outlook and exigencies of
the presidency to assert more robust presidential powers, especially during a war or crisis, than
ha[s] been officially approved by the Supreme Court or than is generally accepted in the legal
academy or by Congress”).
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see
also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(defining “international custom” as “a general practice accepted as law”).
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1); id. cmt. d.
57 See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 36, at 1516 (“The canonical expression of the modern
position is the statement in The Paquete Habana that ‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.’”
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (footnote omitted) (alteration in
original))).
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Constitution,” and that “[f]ederal jurisdiction over cases involving
international law is clear.” 58 Such broad pronouncements appear to
ignore earlier Supreme Court decisions stating or holding, for example,
that some cases implicating the customary law of nations do “not, in
fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 59
Engaging the modern position on its terms, revisionist
commentators, such as Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith,
initially argued that the modern position mischaracterizes pre-Erie case
law and, in any event, did not survive the Court’s pronouncement that
there is no federal general common law. 60 Bradley and Goldsmith
claimed that for the majority of the nation’s history, customary
international law was considered “general common law.” 61 As a
constitutional matter, then, it could not be federal law unless
incorporated as such by the elected branches. 62 Later, however, Bradley,
Goldsmith, and Professor David Moore endorsed viewing some
jurisdiction-granting statutes as authorizing judicial incorporation of
customary international law as federal law. 63 In the context of post-9/11
war powers, however, Bradley and Goldsmith opined that “[a]lthough
the [international] laws of war inform the boundaries of what the
AUMF authorizes, that simply means that as a general matter the
AUMF authorizes no more than what the laws of war permit, not that it
incorporates law-of-war prohibitions.” 64 In other words, in their view
international laws of war enhance the President’s powers in war but
never inherently limit them. 65 This position seems to flow from their
belief that international law is best viewed as general rather than
positivist law that the United States has participated in making, and that

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886–87 (2d Cir. 1980).
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (referring to
admiralty law); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875) (holding no
extant issue of federal law because “the general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations
applicable to this case, were [not] in any respect modified or suspended by the constitution,
laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States” (emphasis added)).
60 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 868, 870.
61 Id. at 850.
62 Id. at 868 (“The Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence suggests the broader
conclusion that [customary international law] is never supreme federal law in the absence of
some authorization from the federal political branches.”).
63 Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 919–24 (2007).
64 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2097 (2005).
65 For a different view, see generally John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the
Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599 (2011) (distilling and
explaining doctrines of military and public necessity from the Supreme Court’s wartime
jurisprudence, both of which are limited by specifically applicable international or domestic
law).
58
59
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“there is a strong argument that the President has the domestic
constitutional authority to violate customary international law.” 66
Even scholarship suggesting that customary international law
could be applied in accordance with conflict-of-laws principles takes the
position that customary international law is properly viewed as
“general” law. 67 This likely results from conflation of the various
historical branches of the law of nations, from an overly narrow view of
legal positivism, from an Anglo-centric “common law” view of the law
of nations, or from concern regarding the proper role or effect of
contemporary international human rights law within the United
States. 68 International human rights law—which primarily developed
after World War II 69 and purports to define rights and obligations
between sovereign nations and individuals within their territory and
jurisdiction 70—is fundamentally different from the concept of the internation-state law of nations that prevailed at the time of the
Constitution’s framing. It therefore requires an entirely separate
constitutional analysis. It is the inter-nation-state concept of
international law that should inform our understanding of the status of
traditional customary international law, particularly international laws
regulating war, in the U.S. legal system.
II. THE POST-WESTPHALIA “LAW OF NATIONS”
Given the prevalent view that customary international law is
properly considered “general law,” 71 it is important to first distinguish
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 64, at 2099.
See Young, supra note 32, at 370; see also William A. Fletcher, Lecture, International
Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 653, 672 (2007).
68 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 30, at 809 (“The modern position has become widely
accepted only in the last twenty years, and to date it has been invoked primarily in international
human rights litigation. . . . The potential consequences . . . , however, are far greater than
merely opening the . . . federal courts to alien–alien suits under the Alien Tort Statute.”); see
also Bellia & Clark, supra note 31, at 744 (“[M]odern and revisionist positions have attempted
to use historical materials and judicial precedents to formulate a uniform rule governing how
federal courts should treat all rules of customary international law, be they traditional
sovereignty-respecting rules or later-emerging sovereignty-limiting rules.”).
69 The first international human rights instrument purporting to articulate general human
rights shared by all persons was the G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights.
70 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 2(1)
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant . . . .”).
71 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 849 (explaining that “the statement in The
Paquete Habana that [customary international law] was ‘part of our law’” was “made under the
rubric of general common law”); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
66
67

DEHN.37.6.3 (Do Not Delete)

CHOICE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

2016]

7/14/2016 5:22 PM

2103

the inter-nation-state law of nations from longstanding notions of a
theoretical, often natural-law-based “general law.” To that end, it is
helpful to briefly retrace broad jurisprudential developments in Western
legal thought surrounding the term “law of nations.” This Part
differentiates jurisprudential notions of a “general” or “common” law
from the post-Westphalian concept of a positivist, inter-nation-state law
of nations. It then demonstrates that the Constitution’s Framers, the
Supreme Court, and important early American jurists understood the
inter-nation-state law of nations to be created by state consent and
entirely exogenous to the Constitution and laws of the United States but
nevertheless applicable in U.S. courts to the extent not superseded by a
requisite act of the U.S. government. Finally, it posits a constitutional
basis for the courts to apply this concept of traditional international law
as a rule of decision in appropriate cases.
A.

Key Law of Nations Developments in Western Legal Thought

Western legal systems have long differentiated the laws of a society
or community from theories of an ideal or general law broadly
applicable or available to all societies. The Romans distinguished the jus
gentium, a law common to all peoples based in or reflecting natural law,
from the jus civile, or the internal law of the Roman people. 72 Later,
some parts of the European continent recognized a general jus
commune, or “common law,” that developed from Roman and canon
law. 73 Often, this “common” or “general” law applied directly in feudal
Western European legal systems but could be superseded by local
custom, statute, or proclamation. 74
Conversely, the Anglo-American concept of common law was
“societal” or “internal” in orientation, informed in part by natural law,
but established and developed by general customs of England and the
reasoned decisions of judges in specific cases. 75 Although generally
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1279–81 & n.169 (1996) (noting that before Erie,
international law “operated as a set of background rules that courts applied in the absence of
any binding sovereign command to the contrary”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 774 (2010) (“[T]hose portions of the common law known
as the law of nations and the law merchant were perhaps universally held to be part of the
‘general law.’”).
72 HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA; FROM
THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, at 26–27 (1845).
73 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 12 (3d ed. 2007).
74 Id.
75 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38–44 (describing the relationship of natural
law to the common law of England).
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applicable throughout England, English common law also allowed for
local alteration by custom. 76
Both the civil and common law legal traditions, however, dealt
almost exclusively with rights and obligations between or among
subnational juridical persons, or between such persons and their
sovereigns, rather than the law applicable between or among
independent sovereign nations or peoples. 77 As the post-Westphalia
concept of the nation-state developed, the Continent rejected the
independent authority of the jus commune in favor of the law-making
power of the territorial sovereign. 78 Given the insular nature of English
common law, England’s transformation into a post-Westphalia nationstate did not require altering the concept of common law that had there
developed. 79 Clearly, however, both legal traditions clearly distinguished
the idea of a theoretical universal or general law common to all societies
or peoples from a specific sovereign’s internal laws. The difference lay in
the origins and substance of law. The common law tradition generally 80
viewed a society’s law as preexisting and, to the extent not prescribed by
a legislative body, deducible by reason; while the civil law tradition
generally viewed law as created by sovereigns.
These differing views of the origins and nature of law eventually
altered views of the jus gentium and law of nations after Westphalia.
Beginning with Hugo Grotius in 1625, commentators began applying
natural law principles to nation-states in their mutual relations to
identify the nature and substance of rules that should govern them.81
With respect to the term jus gentium, “[t]he famous Jesuit, Francesco
Suarez (1548–1617), was the first to see clearly that [it] had come in
post-Roman times to mean two different things: (1) universal law and
(2) international law.” 82 Samuel Pufendorf’s eighteenth-century treatise
confirms that the term “law of nations” also came to be used in two
ways: as a general, theoretical, or ideal law within nation-states or
76 Id. at *63 (“The lex non scritpa, or unwritten [municipal] law [of England], includes not
only general customs, or the common law properly so called; but also the particular customs of
certain parts of the kingdom . . . .”).
77 See, e.g., id. at *67–68 (“General customs . . . are the universal rule of the whole kingdom,
and form the common law, in its . . . usual signification,” governing such matters as trusts and
estates, property, contracts, civil injuries, and crime).
78 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 73, at 21. Many European nation-states
nevertheless “received” the jus commune into their national legal systems due to its appeal as an
“intellectually superior system.” Id. at 10.
79 Id. at 22.
80 As with any general statement, there are exceptions.
81 See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., M.
Walter Dunne 1901) (1625).
82 Arthur Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of International Law,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1952) (footnote omitted).
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societies, and as the law applicable between or among nations. 83 These
different concepts of the “law of nations” are evident in the commentary
of the jurists most influential upon the early United States.
Professor Mark Weston Janis has observed that American lawyers
of the founding generation would have viewed William Blackstone,
Hugo Grotious, and Emmerich de Vattel as “principal sources of the law
of nations.” 84 Other commentators have noted that Vattel 85 and
Blackstone 86 in particular were important to the Constitution’s Framers,
as well as to American judges and jurists. A close examination of each
reveals some similarities and differences regarding the nature and origin
of international law and its status in or relationship to municipal legal
systems.
Although he articulated and applied natural law principles, Grotius
viewed the law of nations in positivist terms. He explained that the rules
of the law of nations arise from the consent of nations, not from the law
of nature, and therefore may differ in different parts of the world. 87 This
clearly articulates a positivist view of international law. As early
American commentator Henry Wheaton later explained, “Grotius
distinguished the law of nations from the natural law by the different
83 See generally SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS (photo. reprint 2007) (Basil Kennett trans., 4th ed. 1729), an eight-volume treatise
outlining natural law principles, their application between or among individuals, and their
application between or among nations or peoples in war and peace. Vattel described Pufendorf
as having “not . . . separately treated of the law of nations, but has everywhere blended it with
the law of nature.” EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at x
(photo. reprint 2011) (Joseph Chitty trans., new ed. 1834).
84 MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 1776–1939, at 11 (2010).
85 JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 16
(paperback ed. 2013) (“Vattel . . . quickly became the most widely read authority in Europe and
its colonies on questions relating to a body of rules known as the law of nations . . . .”); Anthony
J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 445, 471 (2011) (“Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, was well known in England and the
American states at the time of the Founding.”); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the
Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 847 (2006) (“The treatise by the Swiss thinker
Emmerich de Vattel . . . was the most valued of the international law texts the founding group
used during the crucial decade between 1787 and 1797.”); Douglas J. Sylvester, International
Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1, 67 (1999) (observing that in American judicial decisions “in the 1780s and
1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius, twenty-five to Bynkershoek,
and a staggering ninety-two to Vattel”).
86 Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 45, at 8 (“Two works in particular framed the early
American view of the law of nations: Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations and William
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.”).
87 GROTIUS, supra note 81, at ch. 1, § XIV (“[T]he law of nations . . . deriv[es] its authority
from the consent of all, or at least of many nations. It was proper to add MANY, because
scarce[ly] any right can be found common to all nations, except the law of nature, which itself
too is generally called the law of nations. Nay, frequently in one part of the world, that is held
for the law of nations, which is not so in another.”).
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nature of its origin and obligation, which he attributed to the general
consent of nations as evidenced in their usage and practice.” 88 Indeed,
many Western jurists of the founding era distinguished the concept of a
theoretical, natural or general law from the positivist law of nations. 89
This is an important theoretical starting point. According to Grotius
and many others, the inter-nation-state law of nations is neither
synonymous with nor directly derived from natural law. It is discerned
from examining the opinions and practice of nations.
Unlike Grotius, Blackstone stated that the “‘law of
nations’ . . . depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon
mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between” states. 90
Additionally, Blackstone clarified that the law of nations regulated the
“mutual intercourse” of states. 91 Blackstone therefore appears to have
embraced both natural-law and positivist concepts of the law of nations.
Later in his Commentaries, however, Blackstone wrote in more
positivist terms:
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason,
and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants
of the world; in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all
ceremonies and civilities, and to insure the observance of justice and
good faith, in that intercourse which must frequently occur between
two or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to
each. 92

Here, Blackstone appears to accept that natural law informs the
substance of the law of nations, but is not itself the law of nations.
Although “deducible by natural reason,” it is “established by universal
consent.” Note the similarity here to the definition of customary
international law earlier articulated. Note also that Blackstone describes
the law of nations as binding upon both states and their respective
citizens.
Blackstone’s broader understanding of what constituted the law of
nations appears to have affected his view of its status as municipal or
societal law. Regarding its relationship to England’s municipal law,
Blackstone stated that the “law of nations . . . is here adopted in it’s [sic]
full extent by the common law [of England], and is held to be a part of
the law of the land.” 93 Elsewhere, however, he distinguished England’s
WHEATON, supra note 72, at 91.
Henry Wheaton documents the views of several international jurists, from the wellknown, such as Grotius, to the lesser-known, such as an English professor named Zouch. Id. at
88–106.
90 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *43.
91 Id.
92 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at *67.
88
89
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municipal common law from “the law of nature, the revealed law, and
the law of nations.”94 Perhaps to ameliorate this apparent inconsistency,
Blackstone observed that “in mercantile questions, such as bills of
exchange and the like: in all marine causes, relating to freight, average,
demurrage, insurances, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the
law-merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is regularly and
constantly adhered to.”95 Note that he does not say the law merchant
was perfectly adhered to. He next noted, “in all disputes relating to
prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there is no other rule
of decision but this great universal law [the law of nations], collected
from history and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as
are generally approved and allowed of.” 96 Thus, Blackstone appears to
have clearly understood that the source of the law of nations was distinct
from and exogenous to the common law of England. 97
Equally clear, however, is Blackstone’s view that England’s courts
should follow the law of nations in appropriate cases. He prefaced his
statement regarding adoption of the law of nations into the common
law of England by noting that
[i]n arbitrary states this law, wherever it contradicts or is not
provided for by the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the
royal power: but since in England no royal power can introduce a
new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of
nations . . . is here adopted.” 98

This statement, too, adopts the view that the law of nations is both
obligatory and exogenous to the common law of England. It simply
clarifies how the law of nations was given municipal effect. Outside of
England but in territories under its control, Blackstone says the
responsibility for enforcing the law of nations fell to the Monarch. 99
Within England, Blackstone’s “adoption” of the law of nations by
English common law seems to have been result-oriented. It was
calculated to establish that the courts of England must follow the law of
nations in appropriate cases, even if that law was not generally or
94 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *44 (“Thus much I thought it necessary to premise
concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to
treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by
which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed . . . .”).
95 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *67.
96 Id. (emphasis added).
97 Professor Janis similarly noted, “Blackstone’s definition of the law of nations was sourcebased, that is to say that Blackstone distinguished the law of nations from municipal law on the
grounds that the law of nations came from universal sources, municipal law from municipal
sources.” Janis, supra note 37, at 407.
98 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *67.
99 Id.
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specifically enacted by Parliament. Blackstone believed this allowed
England to be “a part of the civilized world.” 100 Rather than suggest that
English courts could simply apply an exogenous law of nations binding
upon the nation and its citizens in appropriate cases, Blackstone, similar
to many contemporary American commentators and judges, 101
apparently thought it necessary that the law of nations be adopted or
enacted into some form of municipal law before it could provide a rule
of decision in national courts. Even if Blackstone was correct about this
as a matter of eighteenth-century English law, England’s national,
common law, legal system was nothing like the republican, multifaceted
nation and legal system later created by the U.S. Constitution, consisting
of a central government of limited powers and numerous subnational
sovereigns with internal laws and legal systems. Therefore, the
suggestion that the United States or its Constitution must have similarly
“adopted” the law of nations as national, federal common law seems an
overly simplistic assumption.
In many respects, the Swiss jurist Vattel viewed the law of nations
similarly to Blackstone. Like Blackstone, Vattel viewed the nation-state
as a distinct subject of law, and the rights and obligations of states inter
se as necessarily different in source and content from municipal law. 102
Vattel, however, differed from Blackstone in one important respect. Like
Grotius, Vattel very clearly distinguished the “law of nations” from
notions of a theoretical universal or general law based in, or flowing
from, natural law. “All . . . treatises,” said Vattel, “in which the law of
nations is blended and confounded with the ordinary law of nature, are
incapable of conveying a distinct idea . . . of the sacred law of
nations.”103 He further noted that “[t]he Romans often confounded the
law of nations with the law of nature . . . as being generally
acknowledged and adopted by all civilized nations.” 104 He posited that
the “right of embassies” 105 and “fecial law . . . [which related] to public
treaties, and especially to war” 106 in Roman law were more akin to “[t]he
moderns [who] are generally agreed in restricting the appellation of ‘the
Id.
See supra notes 11, 27, 63, 64 and accompanying text.
102 According to Vattel, a state is “a moral person . . . susceptible of obligations and rights,”
[Preliminaries] VATTEL, supra note 83, § 2, and one must “apply to nations the rules of the law
of nature” to discern the rights and obligations of states, recognizing that rules may differ
because states are different than people. Id. § 6; see also id.at x (“It did not escape the notice of
[Barbeyrac] . . . that the rules and decisions of the law of nature cannot be purely and simply
applied to sovereign states, and that they must necessarily undergo some modifications in order
to accommodate them to the nature of the new subjects to which they are applied.”).
103 Id. at vii.
104 Id.
105 Id. at viii.
106 Id.
100
101
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law of nations’ to that system of right and justice which ought to prevail
between nations or sovereign states.” 107 Clearly, Vattel understood the
law of nations to be distinct from natural law and exogenous to the
municipal law of nation-states.
Vattel understood the obligatory law of nations to be enacted law—
the product of consent between or among nations rather than a
theoretical, general law. He divided the law of nations into four
categories: (1) the necessary law of nations, (2) the voluntary law of
nations, (3) the conventional law of nations, and (4) the customary law
of nations. 108 Based in natural law, the “necessary law” of nations was
immutable, but binding only upon the conscience of the sovereign. 109
Put differently, natural law provided an edifice upon which the law of
nations stood, but did not constitute a part of its substantive, obligatory
rules. Vattel defined the obligatory, “positive law of nations” as
including voluntary, customary, and conventional law because these
“proceed from the will of Nations”: voluntary from presumed consent,
conventional from express consent, and customary from tacit
consent. 110
To be sure, Vattel’s “voluntary law” category and its notion of
“presumed consent” confusingly implies that states are unconditionally
obligated to observe certain rules of international law. 111 This may be
thought to suggest that a nonconsensual, natural-law obligation is at
work. Read carefully and in light of his preface, though, Vattel’s
voluntary law category encompassed the idea that the exact content of
such rules was to be settled by the general concurrence of civilized states
and their commentators—put otherwise, a general convergence in the
practice and usages of states. 112 So understood, Vattel’s voluntary law
category is a jurisprudential antecedent of contemporary customary
international law, defined earlier, 113 which appears to merge Vattel’s
voluntary and customary law categories. Therefore, Vattel’s concept of
voluntary law is better understood to be positivist law rather than
natural-law-based general law. 114

Id. (emphasis added).
[Preliminaries] VATTEL, supra note 83, §§ 7, 21, 24, 25, 26.
109 Id. § 28.
110 Id. § 27.
111 Id. §§ 6–7.
112 Chitty’s commentary to Vattel’s treatise defines “the universal voluntary law” as “those
rules which are considered to have become law by the uniform practice of nations in general,
and by the manifest utility of the rules themselves.” Id. § 21 n.7.
113 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
114 As Henry Wheaton later noted, the confusion surrounding Vattel’s use of the term
“voluntary law” could have been avoided by equating it to “usage between nations.” WHEATON,
supra note 72, at 189.
107
108
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If there is room for the term “general” in Vattel’s account of the
law of nations, it lies in his notion of voluntary law as a universal body
of law. In this context, however, the term “general” is used in contrast to
discreet rules adopted in agreements or customs between or among
specific nations, or as Vattel put it with regard to treaties, “the
conventional law of nations is not a universal but a particular law.” 115
Thus, for Vattel, the “general” law of nations is not a natural-law based
body of obligatory rules. It is generally applicable law defined by the
practice of states.
Vattel and Blackstone also concurred in the idea that the law of
nations was binding not only between and among nation-states in their
sovereign capacities, but also upon their respective nationals. As noted
earlier, Blackstone stated that the law of nations regulated “mutual
intercourse” of independent states 116 and “the individuals belonging to
each.” 117 Vattel also understood the law of nations to be binding upon
the whole of a nation, meaning not only its government, but also its
national and subnational institutions and citizens. 118 In other words,
under the law of nations, individual citizens were obliged to respect—
and could potentially violate—the rights of a foreign state derivatively
possessed by its citizens or representatives. 119 This was clearly reflected
in two “offenses” against the law of nations articulated by Blackstone:
the violation of the rights of ambassadors and the violation of safe
conduct. 120 Such violations occurred between individuals but created
national responsibility for the law of nations violation. 121
This discussion raises an issue regarding the concept of “positive”
law or legal “positivism.” John Austin’s widely accepted definition of
legal positivism defines law as a superior sovereign command or
declaration. 122 The absence of a supranational sovereign in the
international legal system might thereby require assigning customary
and conventional international law to the category of “general” rather
[Preliminaries] VATTEL, supra note 83, § 24 (emphasis added).
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *43.
117 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *66.
118 [Preliminaries] VATTEL, supra note 83, § 3 (explaining law of nations describes “in what
manner States, as such, ought to regulate all their actions . . . [and] the Obligations of a people,
as well . . . towards other nations”).
119 Bellia & Clark, supra note 85, at 456 (“[T]he First Congress enacted the [Alien Tort
Statute] as part of a broader framework to redress offenses against other nations by US
citizens.”); Lee, supra note 85, at 836–37 (listing three categories of individual violations of the
law of nations within the scope of the Alien Tort Statute).
120 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *68.
121 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 85, at 472–77; Lee, supra note 85, at 836–37 (discussing
injuries to aliens considered a violation of express or implied safe conducts).
122 See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London, J.
Murray 1832).
115
116
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than positive law. 123 Vattel’s approach, like that of Grotius, adopts the
view that sovereigns create or “enact” law by mutual consent or
agreement. 124 It is in this sense that their view of traditional
international law is “positivist” if not “positive.”
To the extent that international law creates legal obligations not
only between nation-states but also binding upon their respective
citizens, it satisfies Austin’s concept of positivism, in that a sovereign
creates rules binding upon those under its authority. Nevertheless,
international law falls short of Austin’s definition of legal positivism in
its state-to-state application. Although further discussion of this point is
beyond the scope of this Article, I nevertheless adopt Vattel’s, Grotius’s,
and to some uncertain extent, even Blackstone’s, view of the law of
nations as enacted, positivist law exogenous to national legal systems. I
next argue that the Constitution’s Framers, the First Congress, and the
Supreme Court viewed it similarly, albeit somewhat inconsistently so. 125
B.

The Law of Nations in the Early United States

Much evidence indicates that the Constitution’s Framers, the First
Congress, and, at least by the very early nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court of the United States, all understood the law of nations
precisely as did Vattel and Grotius without Blackstone’s “adoption”
gloss. This Section examines the Constitution’s text, the First Judiciary
Act, and nineteenth-century decisions of the Supreme Court to
demonstrate that there is ample evidence that the law of nations was
understood to be a body of exogenous, positivist law rather than federal
common law created by adopting a “general” law of nations. It then
briefly shows that American commentators, including Wheaton, James
Kent, Joseph Story, and others, shared this understanding of the law of
nations and its relationship to the Constitution and laws of the United

123 Id. at 208 (“[I]t inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive
law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of
subjection to its author.”); see also Monaghan, supra note 71, at 777 (“[I]n 1788, no one would
have used the word ‘made’ in reference to the law of nations or the law merchant. These bodies
of law were discovered, not enacted.” (footnote omitted)).
124 But see AUSTIN, supra note 122, at 208 (“[T]he law obtaining between nations is law
(improperly so called) set by general opinion.”).
125 But see Monaghan, supra note 71, at 774 (noting that the law merchant and law of
nations “were conceived of as ‘declaratory’ in nature, part of a universal law, which in turn was
rooted in the natural law”). H.L.A. Hart would later attempt to square international law with
positivism by eliminating a Hobbesian sovereign as necessary to the creation of a primary rule
of law. See generally Anthony A. D’Amato, Note, The Neo-Positivist Concept of International
Law, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 321 (1965) (explaining and critiquing Hart’s approach).
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States. Finally, it posits a constitutional basis for courts to apply the
customary inter-nation-state law of nations as a rule of decision.
1.

Inferences from the Constitution’s Text and the First
Judiciary Act

Many inferences about the relationship of customary international
law to the U.S. legal system can be drawn from aspects of the
Constitution’s text coupled with the First Judiciary Act. For example,
the Framers’ decision to vest Congress with the power “[t]o define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations” 126 indicates that the Framers did not believe
federal law would generally or automatically incorporate the customary
law of nations. Otherwise, such offenses would not require legislation to
enable federal courts to punish them, as Blackstone indicated was the
case regarding such offenses in England. 127
Indeed, contrary to some claims, commentary from the
constitutional convention suggests that the Offenses Clause was not
necessary to clarify the content of the law of nations, but rather to
identify and categorize the nature of violations that would be punishable
under U.S. law. 128 For example, Gouverneur Morris asserted, “The word
define is proper when applied to offences in this case; the law of (nations)
being often too vague and deficient to be a rule.” 129 The main objection
to the Offenses Clause was that it would be arrogant for the United
States to assume the power to “define” the law of nations. 130 The obvious
sentiment was that as law created by the consent of some or many
nations, the United States had no independent authority to define the
customary law of nations.
Later commentary clarifies that the gist Gouverneur Morris’s
statement was the need to clarify how offenses would be classified and
punished. In The Federalist, James Madison observed the following with
regard to the Offenses Clause:

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *67–68.
128 But see, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (claiming that the
Offenses Clause needed to refine the law of nations).
129 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND] (second emphasis added) (statement of Gouverneur Morris). Indeed,
the main objection to the clause was that it would be extremely arrogant for the United States to
assume the power to define the law of nations.
130 See id. (“To pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all
the Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance[] that would make us
ridiculous.” (statement of James Wilson)).
126
127
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A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony
is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England;
and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither
the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought
to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made
its own by legislative adoption. 131

Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story similarly noted, “whatever may be
the true import of the word felony at the common law, with reference to
municipal offences, in relation to offences on the high seas, its meaning
is necessarily somewhat indeterminate.”132 Story said the same was true
of other offenses against the law of nations. 133 In other words, because
the law of nations did not (indeed, could not) classify the nature of
various violations in a nation’s municipal law as “felony” or
“misdemeanor,” the Offenses Clause was needed so that Congress could
do so.
Take piracy as an example. Story stated “piracy is perfectly well
known and understood in the law of nations” and that “[t]he common
law, too, recognises, and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its
own municipal code, but as an offence against the universal law of
nations.”134 He then noted that piracy “was no felony, whereof the
common law took any knowledge, &c.; but was only punishable by the
civil law.” 135 Thus, the classification of, and appropriate penal sanction
for, piracy within the U.S. legal system would require federal legislation.
Congress obliged in the Crimes Act of 1790, 136 punishing a variety
of law-of-nations violations, and again in 1819. 137 With regard to piracy,
the latter provided
[t]hat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and
such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or found
in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon
conviction thereof . . . be punished with death. 138

Note that Congress did not find it necessary to clarify what conduct
constitutes the crime of piracy. It merely prescribed who may be
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1157
(1833).
133 Id. § 1158.
134 Id. § 1154.
135 Id. § 1157. When debating the need for the Offenses Clause, Madison also noted “felony
at common law is vague” and did not think that felonies should be defined by English common
law. 2 FARRAND, supra note 129, at 316 (statement of James Madison).
136 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 114.
137 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14.
138 Id.
131
132
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punished by, and the punishment to be adjudged in, a court of the
United States. The adoption of such federal law to prescribe punishment
for even well-established offenses against the law of nations pursuant to
the Offenses Clause suggests that neither the Framers nor the First
Congress understood the law of nations to be federal common law.
Additionally, Congress’s use of the Offenses Clause to allow the
judiciary to provide a tort remedy for all law-of-nations violations
provides additional evidence that the Offenses Clause was not necessary
to refine the substance of the law of nations. 139 The First Congress
vested jurisdiction in the federal courts, “concurrent” with state courts,
over “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 140 Now commonly known as
the Alien Tort Statute or Alien Tort Claims Act, 141 this general grant of
jurisdiction strongly suggests that the law of nations was sufficiently
determinate for general judicial implementation. 142 Using the Offenses
Clause in this way also supports viewing the law of nations as an
exogenous but inherently applicable and enforceable body of law, one
external to the Constitution and laws of the United States, but binding
upon the nation and its citizens. By recognizing that concurrent
jurisdiction existed in state courts, the First Congress also revealed its
understanding that the law of nations is inherently applicable within the
states and their legal systems as well as in federal courts. This does not
mean, however, that Congress viewed the law of nations as supreme
federal law.
The text of Article III of the Constitution indicates that the
Constitution’s Framers also viewed the law of nations as exogenous to,
rather than as part of, federal law. It first vested the Supreme Court and
other federal courts created by Congress with jurisdiction over cases and
139 See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and
Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 504 (2000) (“Just
as the term ‘offense’ encompasses civil as well as criminal wrongs, the term ‘punish’ includes
civil as well as criminal consequences.”); see also J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated
Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 852–53
(2007) (arguing that the Law of Nations Clause allows Congress broad discretion to punish
individuals, foreign states, or even one of the several states for violating customary
international law).
140 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2012)).
141 Now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
142 Although the Supreme Court would later narrow the nature of law-of-nations violations
sufficiently determinate to justify a judicial remedy, it did so with reference to law-of-nations
violations that were well settled at the time of the Constitution’s framing and the First Judiciary
Act. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“[W]e are persuaded that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than
the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”).
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controversies “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.” 143 It then vested the federal courts with jurisdiction over
parties and subject matter likely to implicate the inter-nation-state law
of nations, including: “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls”; cases “between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”; and “all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction.” 144 These specific grants of jurisdiction would
have been redundant to “arising under” jurisdiction and largely
unnecessary if the “Laws of the United States” necessarily included the
law of nations as federal common law (except in the rare cases where
only state law would be relevant). In order to give meaning to the entire
text of Article III, the law of nations must be viewed as distinct from,
rather than part of, the laws of the United States.
And finally, another aspect of the First Judiciary Act strongly
indicates that the law of nations was not understood to be federal
common law. The Act also provided: “the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States
shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply.” 145 If the law of nations were federal common law, this
section of the Act would have been quite problematic. It would arguably
prevent federal courts from applying the law of nations in a common
law trial because neither the law of nations nor federal common law is
listed as a permissible rule of decision. Such a result would have been
contrary to the clear intent of the Alien Tort Statute, discussed earlier,
and particularly absurd given that the Constitution expressly granted
the federal courts power to resolve cases most likely to implicate the law
of nations.
As shown in the next Section, although the Supreme Court
squarely rejected the notion that the customary law of nations had been
adopted as federal common law, it nonetheless used the customary law
of nations as a rule of decision in appropriate cases. This approach

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As the denial or perversion
of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed
among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance
of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”); Bellia & Clark, supra note
85, at 449 (“Article III authorized federal court jurisdiction over a variety of civil cases
implicating the law of nations and US foreign relations, including admiralty disputes, cases
affecting ambassadors, and controversies between foreign citizens and citizens of the United
States.”); Lee, supra note 85, at 835–36 (explaining constitutional grants of jurisdiction
necessary to adjudicate cases arising under the customary law of nations).
145 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34.
143
144

DEHN.37.6.3 (Do Not Delete)

7/14/2016 5:22 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

2116

Vol. 37:2089

further demonstrates its status as exogenous law applicable to the
United States and in its courts unless superseded.
2.

The Supreme Court’s View of the Law of Nations

As early as 1793, the Supreme Court observed that even prior to
ratifying the Constitution, “the United States had, by taking a place
among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of
nations.”146 In 1795, the Supreme Court stated that questions of prize in
U.S. courts were “guided by the law of Nations.” 147 This phrasing
indicates that the Court viewed the law of nations as exogenous, a
preexisting law to which the new United States had become subject.
Views regarding its precise domestic status varied. While it may be true
that “American lawyers and judges repeated [Blackstone’s adoption]
principle constantly, often in language nearly identical to
Blackstone’s,” 148 the emergence of a positivist and entirely exogenous
view of the law of nations appeared in Supreme Court decisions at the
very dawn of the nineteenth century.
For example, in 1801, with regard to the law of war branch of the
law of nations, Chief Justice John Marshall opined “that [C]ongress may
authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply
to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so
far as they actually apply to our situation, must be noticed.” 149 It is clear
from this that Marshall thought the Court was obliged to observe and
apply relevant aspects of the law of nations. With respect to that law,
however, his words “must be noticed” indicate that he did not view it as
domestic law. This choice of terms with reference to the law of nations,
not unique to this case, 150 indicates that the law of nations was not
observed or applied as an adopted, general law. Rather, it signals that the
law of nations was understood to be an exogenous body of law that may
affect certain aspects of a case before the Court. The use of the term
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 88 (1795); see also id. at 91 (Iredell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that all prize causes “are to be determined by the law of nations”).
148 William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Congress and the Courts: Origins of the
Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531, 536 (Pieter H. F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael
Waibel eds., 2010).
149 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
150 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900) (“This rule of international law is one
which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to
give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in
relation to the matter.”); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 188 (1871) (“[B]y common consent
of mankind, these rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation. Of that fact we think
we may take judicial notice.”).
146
147
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“general” also clearly meant only to refer to the full, universal body of
the laws of war rather than to suggest that they were “general law.”
Hamilton had earlier shown a similar understanding of the “general law
of nations” in The Federalist. 151
In New York Life Insurance v. Hendren, the Supreme Court clearly
stated that international laws of war are not inherently federal law. 152 It
found, “the general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations
applicable to this case, were [not] in any respect modified or suspended
by the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the
United States.” 153 For this reason, the Court held that the case involved
no issue of federal law, and that the Court therefore lacked jurisdiction
to review a state court’s judgment regarding the effect of the law of war
on an insurance policy. 154 The Court’s conclusion in this case is
incomprehensible without recognizing that it did not view the law of
nations as adopted federal common law. And again, the Court clearly
used the term “general” to denote “universal” rather than “particular”
law, not as a reference to the law of war as natural-law-based “general
law.” 155
Similarly, the Court considered admiralty law to be independent
from, rather than part of, domestic law in both the U.S. and in
England. 156 In 1828, Chief Justice Marshall clarified that “[a] case in
admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the
United States,” 157 but that, nevertheless, “the law, admiralty and
maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases
as they arise.” 158 This view of maritime law was later reiterated in The
Scotia, in which the Court explained:
It must be conceded, however, that the rights and merits of a case
may be governed by a different law from that which controls a court
in which a remedy may be sought. The question still remains, what
was the law of the place where the collision occurred, and at the time
when it occurred. Conceding that it was not the law of the United
States, nor that of Great Britain, nor the concurrent regulations of the
two governments, but that it was the law of the sea . . . . Undoubtedly,
no single nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of
universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can create
151 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (distinguishing “general law of
nations” from “treaties”).
152 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
153 Id. at 286–87 (emphasis added).
154 Id.
155 But see Bradley, supra note 30, at 812 (“Prior to Erie, customary international law . . . had
the status of general common law.”).
156 Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 11.
157 Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828).
158 Id. at 546.
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obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon
the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not
because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has
been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have
been its origin, whether in the usages of navigation or in the
ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of
the sea only by the concurrent sanction of . . . nations. 159

These statements quite clearly articulate a view of the law of
nations as positivist law established by “common consent” and external
to the U.S. legal system but applicable in its courts. The Court also
clearly stated that this applies, not as domestic law, but as the law
governing aspects of a case properly before the Court. Importantly, the
Court also indicated that this law is applied in the absence of a relevant
treaty, in its words, “concurrent regulations of the two governments,”160
without suggesting that any such bilateral treaty would necessarily
become federal law. Thus, had a treaty governed the matter before the
Court, the Court likely would have applied any relevant rules
established by the treaty rather than general international rules
applicable to all nations.
The Supreme Court’s prize law jurisprudence further confirms the
view that customary international law was entirely exogenous to, rather
than part of, U.S. law. Prize law was considered a species of admiralty
law; the Court repeatedly affirmed that a general grant of admiralty
jurisdiction was sufficient to permit federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction in prize cases. 161 Prize law coupled war powers and property
rights with access to judicial review. It therefore provides a unique and
important lens through which to examine the relationship of the
customary law of nations to U.S. law.
Under the laws of war of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a
general state of war automatically terminated commercial intercourse
between hostile nations 162 and permitted a nation to wage war against
the commercial interests of an enemy state and its nationals. 163 The
practice of seizing commercial ships and their cargo as prize of war was
The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871) (emphasis added).
Id.
161 The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 557–58 (1818) (“The jurisdiction of the
district court to entertain this suit, by virtue of its general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and independent of the special provisions of the prize act of the 26th of June 1812 has been so
repeatedly decided by this court, that it cannot be permitted again to be judicially brought into
doubt.” (citation omitted)).
162 FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH
A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE COURTS 16 (N.Y., John
S. Voorhies 1863); 2 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 4–5 (Washington, D.C., W.H.
Morrison 1886) (collecting sources).
163 UPTON, supra note 162, at 37.
159
160
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the maritime manifestation of this state of affairs. Suspected enemy
ships were captured and brought into ports for judicial adjudication as
to vessel and cargo. 164 Those belonging or imputed to the enemy were
condemned, and the proceeds vested in the capturing sovereign,
typically minus remuneration for the capturing vessel and crew. 165 The
vast expanses of the high seas provided ample opportunity for
individuals to attempt to avoid or exploit constraints on trade imposed
by war. Some vessel owners engaged in trade through third-party
nationals whose countries were neutral as to a given conflict. 166 Other
ship captains engaged in acts of war as privateers with national
commissions, and others in acts of piracy. 167 Courts exercising prize
jurisdiction determined the amenability of various ships and their cargo
to capture and condemnation. 168
The Supreme Court held that prize proceedings were specialized in
both form and substance. According to Justice Story,
[n]o proceedings can be more unlike than those in the Courts of
common law and in the admiralty. In prize causes, in an especial
manner, the allegations, the proofs and the proceedings are, in
general, modelled [sic] upon the civil law, with such additions and
alterations as the practice of nations and the rights of belligerents and
neutrals unavoidably impose. 169

Two years later, the Court added an appendix to a cursory opinion,
which began:
I[n] the Appendix to the first volume of these Reports . . . a summary
sketch was attempted of the practice in prize causes in some of its
most important particulars. It has been suggested that a more
enlarged view of the principles and practice of prize courts might be
useful, and in case of a future war, save much embarrassment to
captors and claimants. With this view the following additional sketch
is submitted to the learned reader. 170

See, e.g., DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME: LAWFUL LOOTING ON THE HIGH SEAS IN
DAYS OF FIGHTING SAIL 1–2 (1999). The need for careful parsing of ship and cargo is
demonstrated by The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815), in which the Court exempted the
goods of a Spanish national (neutral) on an enemy (English) vessel from condemnation.
165 PETRIE, supra note 164, at 5–6. Note that the sovereign’s share was often waived for
privateers (privately owned vessels and crews commissioned to supplement national navies in
times of war) “in order to induce private parties to make the investments, and take the risks
necessary to aid the national war effort against a maritime enemy.” Id. at 3.
166 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (involving perhaps one
of the most interesting examples of this type of trade); see infra Section IV.A.
167 Cf. PETRIE, supra note 164, at 69.
168 Id. at 9.
169 The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815).
170 The London Packet, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 371, app. at 1 (1817).
164

THE
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The Court then provided a heavily referenced treatise of customary
international rules governing prize practice, including not only
substantive law, but also evidentiary burdens and permissible methods
of proof. 171 Thus, not only was substantive prize law inherently
applicable in U.S. courts, so too were its rules of evidence and
procedure. This is undoubtedly because the Rules Enabling Act, 172
which allows the federal judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure and
evidence, would not arrive for over a century after this decision. Prior to
the Rules Enabling Act, federal courts followed the “conformity
principle” in actions at law, conforming their rules to those of the
jurisdiction in which they sat, typically state courts. 173 Thus, the Court’s
understanding that not only substantive but also procedural prize law
applied in federal courts strongly confirms the view that the Court
understood the customary law of nations to be an entirely exogenous
but obligatory body and system of law. 174 Otherwise, it would probably
have recommended following international law as federal common law
while observing state rules of procedure and evidence.
The Supreme Court’s positivist view of the substantive law of
nations sometimes waivered, even in the Marshall Court. For example,
in the 1814 case of Brown v. United States, Chief Justice Marshall found
that pervasive contemporary state treaty practice had modified a general
law-of-nations rule allowing the immediate seizure of enemy
commercial property upon the outbreak of war. 175 This is clearly a
positivist approach, in that in Marshall’s view, pervasive state practice
established a new customary rule. The next year, Marshall described the
“unwritten” law of nations less positivist terms:
The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those
rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized
by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and
America. This law is in part unwritten, and in part conventional. To
ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of
reason and justice . . . . 176

Id.
Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
173 Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 144, 145–46 (1948).
174 See WHEATON, supra note 72, at 108 (“The rule, by which the prize courts . . . are bound
to proceed in adjudicating such cases, is not the municipal law of their own country, but the
general law of nations . . . by which their own country is bound to other states.”).
175 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); see also discussion infra
Section IV.C.
176 Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815).
171
172
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Some argue this statement references natural law and is proof that
the law of nations was understood to be general law. 177 In the next
passage of the same opinion, however, Marshall recognized that other
states’ view of the law of nations were relevant to fixing its content.
[T]hese principles will be differently understood by different nations
under different circumstances, we consider them as being, in some
degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The
decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded
upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as
authority, but with respect. The decisions of the Courts of every
country show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood
in that country, and will be considered in adopting the rule which is
to prevail in this. 178

In other words, natural law principles, including reason and justice,
informed the content of the law of nations. But states ultimately
determined its substance, whether through diplomatic (in treaties) or
judicial means, or through other state practice. Just as Jeremy Bentham
critiqued Blackstone, we must not confuse that upon which the
customary law of nations depends, natural law, for that which the
customary law of nations is, especially today, positivist law. 179 The
Marshall Court appears to have understood it to be generally applicable
law established by universal consent or convergence in international
opinion rather than a theoretical “general law” established by nature and
discovered solely through reason.
To the extent that the Court sometimes relied upon an AngloAmerican common law approach to interstitially fill gaps in “settled”
international law, this should not undermine the positivist approach
that appeared as early as 1814 in Brown, was reiterated in 1871 in The
Scotia, 180 and became firmly entrenched by 1900 in Paquete Habana.
This more contemporary, positivist concept of customary international
law certainly affects how U.S. courts should now determine the
substance of international norms establishing a rule of decision.
However, this Anglo-American common law approach to determining
the substance of customary international law does not change the
fundamental understanding that U.S. courts observed and applied it as
an exogenous but obligatory body of law in appropriate cases.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 822–23.
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 198.
179 See Janis, supra note 37, at 406 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the
Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT
36–37 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977)).
180 The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871); see also supra text accompanying note 159.
177
178
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Early American Legal Commentary

Early American legal commentary also adopted an entirely
exogenous view of law of nations. James Kent, author of “the first great
American law treatise,”181 clarified that the law of nations encompassed
“the external rights and duties of nations.” 182 Henry Wheaton observed
that there are two bodies of public law: “internal” (droit public interne)
and “external” (droit public externe). 183 He equated the former to
constitutional law 184 and the latter to international law. 185 And former
Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, George B. Davis, also
observed that “national” or “municipal” law governed “the relations of
citizens to the state and to each other . . . while those which regulate the
intercourse of sovereign states with each other are known as
‘international’ laws.” 186 As Professor Arthur Mark Weisburd later
explained, and is readily evident in the writings of Vattel and Grotius,
and in cases such as The Scotia, “human agency creates law,” and courts
must look “to the appropriate [human] agency to determine a particular
law’s content.” 187 Weisburd’s statement would have been more complete
and precise if he had appended “and source.” The government of a
sovereign nation-state is the “human agency” of its people that
promulgates internal, or municipal, law. Human agency in the form of
express or implied consent by two or more sovereign nation-states
creates external, international law. Such law is not properly equated to
“general” law in the jus gentium or Anglo-American common law sense
of the term.
C.

Why the Law of Nations as a Nonfederal Rule of Decision?

Neither the law of nations generally nor customary international
law are specifically addressed in the Supremacy Clause or Rules of
Decision Act. How, then, does customary international law provide a
rule of decision without incorporation through the Offenses Clause or
the exercise of another power of Congress? Why did Chief Justice
JANIS, supra note 84, at 50.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 21 (N.Y., O. Halsted 1826).
183 1 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35–36 (William Beach
Lawrence ed., 2d ed. 1863).
184 Id. at 35.
185 Id. at 36.
186 GEORGE B. DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH AN ACCOUNT OF ITS
ORIGIN, SOURCES AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (1900).
187 A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 51 (1995).
181
182
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Marshall say the international laws of war “must be noticed,” 188 and that
admiralty law is unquestionably applied in appropriate cases? 189 Why
did Justice Story believe that both substantive and procedural prize law
applied in federal courts?
The answers to these questions derive from an understanding of
the customary law of nations as exogenous, obligatory, and positivist
law rather than general law adopted as common law. Customary
international law is “part of our law” not because it is federal law, but
because the United States was a member of what was then understand to
be the community of “civilized nations” to which the law of nations
applied. 190 A proper exercise of “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States” 191 therefore requires courts and judges to observe the customary,
state-to-state law of nations, like other sources of law, when
applicable. 192 To use the words of the Court, “a jurist must search . . . in
those principles of action which are sanctioned by the usages, the
national acts, and the general assent, of that portion of the world of
which he considers himself as a part.” 193 Or as the Court later stated,
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”194 Indeed, because customary international law is
positivist law created at least in part by the actions of elected United
States government officials, it would seem particularly inappropriate for
a U.S. court to refuse to consider or apply it when relevant.
There is an even more fundamental reason that customary
international law should not be considered federal common law: neither
the Constitution and laws of the United States, nor the laws of the
several states, necessarily apply to every aspect of every case brought
before a U.S. court. This is particularly true when the United States
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801); see supra text accompanying note 149.
See The London Packet, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 371 app. at 1 (1817); supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
190 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[W]here there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations . . . .” (emphasis added)).
191 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1), (3) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)
(“International law . . . [is] law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several
States . . . . [and] [c]ourts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law.”).
With due respect to the esteemed authors, this conflates the nature, source, status, and effect of
international law. Treaties are made supreme law in the United States by the Supremacy Clause;
customary international law is obligatory by its nature, but may or may not create a federal
question in the form of foreign affairs federalism, see infra notes 382–84 and accompanying
text, in its application to the facts of a given case.
193 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825).
194 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
188
189
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exercises external sovereign powers, such as the war powers, and
particularly when U.S. courts exercise jurisdiction over cases arising
outside of the United States. As Blackstone said regarding cases
involving prize, shipwreck, and others, in those cases “there is no other
rule of decision but [the law of nations].” 195 This fundamental limitation
on the extraterritorial competence of U.S. municipal law, whether
common law or statute, explains why Erie does not necessarily affect the
resort to international law as a rule of decision in cases involving the
exercise of external sovereign powers.
III. CLARIFYING THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF FEDERAL RULES OF
DECISION
Because the revisionist position claims Erie generally precludes the
resort to customary international law as a rule of decision without
express or fairly implied incorporation by the federal elected branches
or state law, it is important to closely examine the origins of that
decision. They began in 1789 when, as earlier discussed, the First
Judiciary Act provided, “the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law . . . in cases where they apply.” 196 This is now known as the
Rules of Decision Act. 197
Until the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie, federal courts followed the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. 198 In common law cases involving parties
with diverse U.S. state citizenship, “the laws of the several states”
included only “the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative
authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of
laws.” 199 Regarding questions of “general law,” the Swift court held that
federal courts were not bound by state court decisions “where the state
tribunals are called upon . . . to ascertain, upon general reasoning and
legal analogies . . . what is the just rule . . . to govern the case.”200 This
Part analyzes precisely how and why the Erie Court overruled Swift, and
why the Erie decision does not affect the Court’s use of customary
international law as a rule of decision in cases involving the exercise of
external sovereign powers by the United States. It also distinguishes
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *67.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2012)).
197 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
198 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
199 Id. at 18.
200 Id. at 19.
195
196
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such cases from those in which the Court has clearly created
constitutionally based federal common law by observing fundamental
international legal principles and the Constitution’s separation of
powers.
A.

Erie’s Domestic, Common Law Logic

Erie involved a suit brought by a Pennsylvania resident for injuries
he suffered while traveling a footpath along a railroad right of way in
that state. 201 He sued in a federal court in New York because the railroad
was incorporated there, invoking diversity of state citizenship
jurisdiction. 202 The trial court refused to consider Pennsylvania
common law, finding the issue to be one of general law reserved to its
independent judgment by Swift; the plaintiff won a substantial
judgment. 203 On appeal, Erie Railroad claimed the federal trial court
should have applied Pennsylvania law in accordance with the clear
language of the Rules of Decision Act. 204
The Supreme Court agreed. It found that the Swift doctrine had
been applied to a broad range of local cases, including “questions of
purely commercial law . . . the obligations under contracts entered into
and to be performed within the state . . . the liability for torts committed
within the State upon persons resident or property located there, . . . and
the right to exemplary or punitive damages.” 205 The Court also noted
federal courts had disregarded “state decisions construing local deeds,
mineral conveyances, and even devises of real estate.” 206 Insisting that
state law must govern “any case” not involving the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties of the United States, the Court declared “[t]here is
no federal general common law.” 207 Neither Article III courts nor
Congress have “power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.” 208
None of this is objectionable except for the Court’s imprecise and
overbroad statement, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 78.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the law of the state.” 209 That statement elides the qualifying language in
the First Judiciary Act: “in trials at common law . . . in cases where they
apply,” 210 and the context of Erie, a diversity of state citizenship case. By
adding these qualifications, it becomes clear that neither the
Constitution nor the Rules of Decision Act preclude the possibility that
other sources of law, whether foreign or international, might govern the
rights of parties otherwise properly before a federal court. 211 For
example, another diversity of state citizenship case decided shortly after
Erie, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., held that federal
courts must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which they
sit. 212 This, too, was a decision about the relationship of federal courts
hearing diversity cases to state law rather than the relationship of public
international to municipal law.
In fact, it would be odd for either federal or state common law to
govern the rights of an individual detained outside the United States, or
the rights to a ship and its cargo seized on the high seas. As explained
earlier, the Anglo-American concept of common law is insular and
inherently societal or internal; it is therefore primarily territorial.213
Indeed, Erie’s logic strongly reinforces this view. Similarly, the
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law recognizes
traditional limits on the powers of state sovereignty, providing that
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.” 214 This reflects the “presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” 215 This
presumption therefore reinforces a necessary distinction not only
between domestic and foreign law, but also between municipal and
international law. Moreover, nineteenth century American
commentators recognized only limited permissible bases for the
extraterritorial application of municipal laws. 216 Thus, to argue that Erie

Id. (emphasis added).
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2012)) (emphasis added).
211 See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4–5 (1975) (requiring
application of state conflict-of-laws rules in a diversity case, which might—in the context of the
case—result in the application of Cambodian substantive tort law).
212 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“We are of opinion that
the prohibition declared in Erie . . . extends to the field of conflict of laws. . . . Otherwise the
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.” (emphasis added)).
213 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *66–68.
214 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
215 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
216 See, e.g., 1 WHEATON, supra note 183, at 231 (recognizing territoriality, the punishment
of crimes aboard “public and private vessels on the high seas” and aboard “public vessels in
foreign ports,” punishment of nationals for municipal crimes wherever committed, and certain
209
210
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entirely precludes resort to international law as a rule of decision,
particularly in cases arising extraterritorially or involving the exercise of
external sovereign powers, is to ignore not only the context and
reasoning of Erie but also long-held understandings of the
extraterritorial competence of domestic or municipal law, both common
and statutory.
Some suggest that in overruling Swift and not just its various
outgrowths, the Court rejected the inherent applicability of
international law, in the form of the law merchant. 217 Recall, though,
that although Blackstone included the law merchant as part of the law of
nations typically followed at English common law, he distinguished it
from other areas of law, such as prize and shipwrecks, in which the only
rule of decision could be the law of nations. 218 Vattel did not even
include the law merchant in his explication of the law of nations. In fact,
Vattel asserted that individual nation-states “are obliged to protect
commerce . . . by good laws, in which every merchant, whether citizen
or foreigner, may find security. In general, it is equally the interest and
the duty of every nation to have wise and equitable commercial laws
established in the country.” 219 In short, Vattel had already relegated
commercial law to the realm of municipal rather than international or
“general” law, 220 where it remains today as so-called “private”
international law. 221
To the extent the law merchant remained relevant to the Supreme
Court, it was indeed as general common law rather than an exogenous,
positivist law of nations. The Supreme Court referenced the “lawmerchant” or “lex mercatoria” only sparingly after Swift, twice when
exercising its general interpretive authority under the Swift line of
cases. 222 Otherwise, between Swift and Erie, the Court only twice
referred to treatises with “lex mercatoria” in the title, 223 and twice
referenced the “law merchant” when interpreting or applying a federal
“offences against the law of nations, by whomsoever and wheresoever committed” as potential
bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
217 See Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1901–1945,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note
45, at 225, 243–44 (“Swift itself was in a sense an international law case (arising from the lex
mercatoria) . . . .”).
218 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
219 1 VATTEL, supra note 83, § 109 (emphasis added).
220 The author was unable to locate a single use of either “lex mercatoria” or “law merchant”
in Vattel’s treatise.
221 See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 27, at 273–74.
222 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888); Bank of U.S. v. United States, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 711 (1844).
223 Nat’l Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 152, 154 n.4 (1869); United
States v. Carr, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 1, 7 (1850).
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statute containing that term. 224 Furthermore, Hendren was decided in
1875, during the heyday of the Swift doctrine, and yet the Court clearly
held that the law-of-war branch of the law of nations was not federal law
conferring arising-under appellate jurisdiction. 225 All of this strongly
indicates that the Court no longer, if it ever had, viewed the law
merchant as part of an exogenous law of nations generally incorporated
by federal common law. Indeed, England’s courts had also long
permitted local deviations from the law merchant. 226
B.

Federal Rules of Decision for External Affairs

Only two years prior to Erie, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., the Supreme Court clearly endorsed the proposition that
the constitutional separation-of-powers analysis and selection of rules of
decision differ in cases involving matters of external sovereignty. 227
Holding that Congress could delegate its powers to the executive in
matters of foreign affairs (at a time when such delegations of legislative
power to the executive were not permitted in domestic matters), 228 the
Court reasoned, “[t]he broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs.” 229 Putting aside the Court’s discussion of
the source of the federal government’s external sovereign powers, which
224 Indep. Sch. Dist. of Ackley v. Hall, 113 U.S. 135, 138 (1885); Town of Thompson v.
Perrine, 106 U.S. 589, 592 (1883).
225 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
226 Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 15 (“When [English] courts adopted the law merchant (a
branch of the law of nations) as part of the common law, the law merchant was subject to local
deviations as part of the common law.”).
227 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
228 See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“[I]n carrying
out that constitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the national fundamental
law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the judicial
branch . . . .”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That [C]ongress cannot
delegate legislative power to the [P]resident is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the [C]onstitution.”). But
see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1721, 1722 (2002) (“Nondelegation is nothing more than a controversial theory that floated
around the margins of nineteenth-century constitutionalism—a theory that wasn't clearly
adopted by the Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.”). The Court
eventually approved of delegation of legislative power to the executive branch so long as
Congress provides an “intelligible principle.” Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (“If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”).
229 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315–16.
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has been heavily debated, 230 the Court clearly signaled that the
separation-of-powers analysis and rules of decision differ in matters
involving “external sovereignty.” 231
To support this proposition, the Court sensibly noted, “neither the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens” and that
“operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties,
international understandings and compacts, and the principles of
international law.” 232 Thus, the Court clarified that the Constitution and
laws of the United States primarily apply to internal U.S. matters, an
approach it had also followed in relation to unincorporated territories,
or insular possessions. 233 Treaties and international customs have a
different purpose and nature, and therefore regulate the external acts of
the government in appropriate cases. As the Court said in Paquete
Habana, international law “must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”234
It is for all of these reasons that the Paquete Habana Court held
“where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations.” 235 This statement clarifies potential sources of rules of
decision in matters involving an exercise of external sovereignty.
Because Paquete Habana involved the capture of, and rights to, foreign
flagged coastal fishing vessels and cargo seized during an international
armed conflict in Cuban coastal waters, the law of nations would
regulate the rights to the vessel and cargo, rather than any U.S. federal
or state common law. Additionally, because the case involved an aspect
of the war with Spain, potentially controlling legislative or executive acts
must refer to exercises of the nation’s war powers rather than the federal
government’s internal lawmaking powers. 236
230 For an excellent analysis of Curtiss-Wright and whether U.S. foreign affairs powers stem
from delegation of those powers by the ratifying states or as an incident of sovereignty in the
international system, see RAMSEY, supra note 32, at 13–48.
231 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
232 Id. (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)).
233 Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850) (“[Territories] are not organized
under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government, as
the organic law; but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department, and subject to
its supervision and control.”). Admission of a territory into the Union as a state was the point
at which it became subject to the Constitution’s internal provisions and separation of powers.
Id. at 242–43. (“The admission of the State into the Union brought the Territory under the full
and complete operation of the Federal Constitution, and the judicial power of the Union could
be exercised only in conformity to the provisions of that instrument.”).
234 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
235 Id.
236 See infra Part IV.
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In this context, then, a controlling judicial decision would be one
that has settled: (1) the controlling nature of a legislative or executive
act, (2) the applicability and judicial enforceability of a relevant treaty,
or (3) as in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, discussed earlier, 237 the
content of any relevant customary international law. 238 For example, the
Court’s conclusion in Paquete Habana—that customary international
law exempted coastal fishing vessels from prize capture—would settle
the content of that particular international rule for subsequent cases in
U.S. courts. No lower court would later need to engage in the lengthy
analysis undertaken in Paquete Habana to determine the substance of
customary international law on that issue. Thus, Supreme Court
precedent might settle certain aspects of the choice of law analysis,
including the content of relevant international law, without having
adopted customary international law as federal common law.
C.

Distinguishing Internal from External Rules of Decision

There are clearly cases in which a federal court’s observance of
customary international law must be understood to create a federal
common law rule based upon the Constitution’s separation of powers. 239
A paradigmatic example is The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, in
which the Court observed the international legal principle of sovereign
immunity in a suit concerning a foreign public vessel in a U.S. port. 240
Because the decision provided a rule limiting the power of domestic
courts established by the Constitution and federal statutes, the case must
be viewed as creating municipal federal common law—now statutorily
superseded by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 241
A similar case is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, in which the
Court observed the “act of state” doctrine. 242 The Court relied heavily on
the Constitution’s separation of foreign affairs powers in deciding that it
could not review the acts of a recognized foreign government in its own
territory. 243 This doctrine, however, stems in large part from general
See supra notes 174, 176 and accompanying text.
Regarding the Court’s conclusively determining the latter, see Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar
v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (“The decisions of the Courts of every country
show how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in that country, and will be
considered in adopting the rule which is to prevail in this.”).
239 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (1975). This discussion is not meant to exclude other forms of federal common law.
240 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
241 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
242 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
243 Id. at 401.
237
238
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international legal principles regarding sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, and political independence.
The Court’s implicit reliance on these international legal principles
in Sabbatino is more obvious in Sabbatino’s predecessor, Underhill v.
Hernandez. 244 In Underhill, the Court clearly invoked well-settled
international legal principles, stating, “[e]very sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory.” 245 The Court
then clarified that “[r]edress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.” 246 In other words, such cases involved
matters to be resolved through external sovereign powers of diplomacy
rather than domestic judicial powers. These cases must therefore be
viewed as having derived from principles of international law, which
necessarily inform the proper view of the Constitution’s separation of
both domestic and foreign affairs powers, 247 a municipal rule of decision
regarding the availability of redress in federal courts. 248
That Sabbatino and Underhill should be understood to create a
constitutionally based federal common law from international norms
and the separation of powers is further demonstrated by cases in which
the Court observed what might be termed a corollary doctrine based in
international neutrality law. As early as 1795, the Supreme Court
observed the law of nations rule that those commissioned by foreign
governments to engage in prize practice “are not amenable before the
tribunals of neutral powers for their conduct.” 249 Following this basic
principle, in The Nueva Anna & Liebre, 250 the Court refused to give
effect to the judgment of a Mexican admiralty court, finding that the
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Id. at 252.
246 Id.
247 See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 31.
248 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 9 (arguing that Sabbatino applied a “constitutionally
derived” rule of decision to preserve federal political branch control over the conduct of foreign
affairs); Ernest A. Young, Historical Practice and the Contemporary Debate over Customary
International Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 39 (2009) (“[T]he Court made clear that its
power to fashion federal common law rules to protect the foreign relations prerogatives of the
political branches did not depend upon the law of nations.”). While it is true that the Court
made this claim, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398, it is unlikely the Underhill or Sabbatino Courts
would have developed or applied the act of state doctrine in the absence of the basic principles
of international law recognized in Underhill. Those principles necessarily inform the separation
of powers issues. Of course, the Court’s “power” to fashion federal common law must reside, if
anywhere, within the Constitution’s vesting of the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one
supreme Court,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, rather than international law.
249 United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 130–31 (1795).
250 The Nueva Anna & Liebre, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 193 (1821).
244
245
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United States government had not “hitherto acknowledged the existence
of any Mexican republic or state at war with Spain” so that the Court
could not consider as legal “any acts done under the flag and
commission of such republic or state” without violating U.S. neutrality
obligations. 251 In United States v. Palmer, 252 the Court held that if the
U.S. government remained neutral with regard to a war between
another country (in this case, Spain) and its revolting colony, the Court
could not apply a domestic criminal law in such a way as to violate that
neutrality. 253 “To decide otherwise,” the Court said, “would be to
determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties was unlawful,
and would . . . arrange the nation to which the court belongs against that
party. This would transcend the limits prescribed to the judicial
department.” 254 Each of these cases involve a domestic rule of decision
based in the Constitution’s separation of foreign affairs powers, which
effects the proper role of the national courts in the dispute.
More recently, the Supreme Court indicated that certain foreign
official immunities might apply in U.S. courts in the absence of federal
legislation, stating that “[e]ven if a suit is not governed by the [Foreign
Sovereign Immunities] Act, it may still be barred by foreign sovereign
immunity under the common law.”255 The court did not clarify whether
it was referring to federal common law or the common law of one of the
several states. It remanded the case to allow the district court to first
pass on these important questions. 256 Given the logic of McFadden and
Sabbatino, it seems fairly obvious that this must be a constitutionally
based issue of federal common law delimiting the power of domestic
courts in matters affecting foreign affairs. 257
Of course, any municipal U.S. rule of decision incorporating, or
derived in part from, international law must conform to all relevant

251 Id. at 193–94; see also Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808) (reaching a similar
result with regard to a prize judgment by Santo Domingo while at war with France), overruled
in part by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
252 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). Specifically, the Court held that
“[i]t may be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and recognizes the
existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as criminal those acts of hostility which war
authorizes, and which the new government may direct against its enemy.” Id. at 635; see also
The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 63–64 (1819) (holding that the government of a
neutral country—in this case, the United States—cannot adjudge the legality of captures jure
belli made by a revolutionary colonial government against its enemy—in this case, Spain).
253 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 635.
254 Id.
255 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 (2010).
256 Id. at 325–26.
257 See Vázquez, supra note 36, at 1538 (“Although the Court did not specify the nature of
this common law, the Court’s discussion of the pre-FSIA regime leaves no doubt that it
regarded the relevant law as federal, not State, law.”).
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constitutional requirements, including the Bill of Rights. 258 As will be
demonstrated shortly, potentially applicable constitutional constraints
have not been observed or applied in cases where the Court has given
effect to the customary international laws of war. 259 This reinforces the
idea that the mere resort to international law as a rule of decision should
not be understood to create municipal common law. It also reinforces
the principle that the relevant constitutional analysis necessarily differs
in cases involving the exercise of external sovereign powers.
There are two primary reasons why no one approach to the
domestic status or effect of international law in U.S. law has gained
general acceptance. First, many scholars (and judges) postulate “one size
fits all” theories 260 or offer more nuanced approaches without fully
addressing or explaining their historical antecedents. 261 As
demonstrated above, the Court has frequently observed international
law, but not always in the same way or for the same reasons. There is
second a point of confusion: subsidiary procedural or substantive rights,
including remedial rights, may be domestic in nature as The Scotia
indicates, 262 and as is the case with the Alien Tort Statute and its AngloAmerican common law tort cause of action and remedy. 263 But the fact
258 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (determining with regard to civilian U.S. nationals
abroad that a treaty could not expand the scope of military criminal jurisdiction beyond
constitutional limits); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620–21 (1870) (finding
with regard to a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe within U.S. territory that
“[i]t need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in
violation of that instrument”); see also HENKIN, supra note 21, at 237 (noting that all forms of
international law are subordinate to “constitutional prohibitions, notably those of the Bill of
Rights” without distinguishing between internal and external rules of decision).
259 See infra Part III.
260 See sources cited supra notes 26–27.
261 See Weisburd, supra note 187, at 49 (concluding that “[i]n the same way that courts will,
when required by relevant conflicts rules, apply the law of some foreign nation, so they would
apply international law in proper cases,” without explaining what cases those might be); Young,
supra note 32, at 468 (“I would allow courts to employ customary norms so long as they can
point to an otherwise valid choice of law rule that would permit application of customary law in
the circumstances at issue.”).
262 The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871) (“[T]he rights and merits of a case may be
governed by a different law from that which controls a court in which a remedy may be
sought.” (emphasis added)).
263 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court concluded that the Alien Tort Statute “is
best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The common
law tort cause of action (or remedial right) is a unique aspect of English common law legal
systems. The international law violation it vindicates, however, need not be domesticated in
order to provide such a remedy. Indeed, many cases arise in foreign countries and it would be
odd to view the violations of the law of nations giving rise to them as the violation of a
domesticated international law, which is then extraterritorially applied. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 330 (1997).
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that municipal law may also be relevant to some aspect of a case does
not transform the international nature of an applicable conductregulating rule when “questions of right” or duty are affected by it. 264 A
careful reading of the Court’s cases involving exercises of the nation’s
war powers demonstrates the validity of this more nuanced approach.
IV. PAQUETE HABANA DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
WARTIME JURISPRUDENCE
The validity and contours of this choice of law approach to
categorizing rules of decision involving international law is further
demonstrated by the Court’s wartime jurisprudence. First, recall that the
Constitution allocates war powers to the executive and legislative
branches. The President is designated Commander-in-Chief, 265 while
Congress is vested with the powers to: declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal, and make rules for captures on land and water;266
to raise, maintain, and make rules for the government and regulation of
the armed forces; 267 and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 268 Questions
regarding which branch, if any, is supreme to the other in various
matters of war are certainly not new. 269 When precedent is properly
interpreted, however, the Court’s general approach has been to uphold
statutes within Congress’ broad constitutional competencies in the face
of any conflicting Executive Branch actions. 270 The case law strongly
indicates that while the Executive possesses the “power to employ all
military measures . . . reasonably calculated to defeat a national enemy,”
those measures must “not [be] prohibited by applicable law,” including
both international and any specifically applicable U.S. law. 271 The
previous analysis explains why this is generally the case. This Part
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
266 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
267 Id. cls. 12–14.
268 Id. cl. 18.
269 See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman,
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 64, at 2094;
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005).
270 See generally Dehn, supra note 65 (describing the Court’s approach towards
congressional action that conflicts with that of the executive branch).
271 Id. at 605.
264
265
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further investigates the Court’s choice-of-law approach in its wartime
and closely related jurisprudence.
The contemporary international law of war, known as international
humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict, largely consists of
conventional and customary constraints on the permissible means and
methods of warfare. Contemporary international humanitarian law
oftentimes prohibits conduct once permitted by the law of war. Before
the Second World War, for example, wars between nations or peoples
included some aspects their economies and citizenry. 272 The law of war
regulated the rights and obligations of the belligerent parties and their
citizens, permitting such things as the confiscation of enemy debts and
property. 273 In other words, war completely altered the legal relationship
of a state and its citizens to enemy nations and citizens. This Part
demonstrates that as the law of war evolved and constraints on war
increased, the Supreme Court consistently observed customary
international law as a relevant rule of decision in appropriate cases.
While doing so, the Court also clarified the Constitution’s separation of
war powers and other constitutional questions informing a proper
application of the Paquete Habana choice-of-law framework.
This Part more fully explicates the Paquete Habana framework. It
demonstrates that the Supreme Court traditionally applied customary
international law applicable to armed conflict with foreign nations,
powers, or peoples as an exogenous rule of decision. It also
demonstrates that the Court did not understand these rules of decision
or the matters to which they pertain to be constrained or qualified by
the Constitution’s assignment of internal sovereign powers or the Bill of
Rights, but rather its allocation of external sovereign powers. 274

272 UPTON, supra note 162, at 6–7 (citing sources); see also id. at 16 (“The existence of war
places each individual citizen of the respective belligerent nations in a condition of common
hostility.”).
273 Id. at 36–37 (discussing confiscation of property); id. at 40–41 (discussing confiscation of
debts).
274 As earlier noted, some U.S. law incorporates and implements this law in ways that
necessarily create domestic law. See The War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat.
2104 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012)) (establishing federal offenses
incorporating customary and conventional law-of-war violations); John C. Dehn, The Hamdan
Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The Common Law Origins of ‘Murder in
Violation of the Law of War’, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63 (2009) (arguing that Winthrop
commentary postulates municipal U.S. common law war crimes); see also United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–59 (1820) (clarifying federal crime of piracy made
punishable by Congress incorporates law of nations by reference).
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Prize Law

Prize law’s importance was earlier discussed. 275 However, some
might assume that prize law’s status as a part of admiralty law weakens
its precedential value. The Supreme Court has only “generally treated
the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption
against extraterritorial application” of domestic law. 276 If admiralty law
is “law of the place” as indicated in The Scotia, 277 and prize law is a
species of admiralty law, then broad doctrinal claims based upon the
Court’s approach in prize cases might be undermined by simply noting
that they arise in areas where all states lack comprehensive authority to
independently legislate. However, cases like Paquete Habana, in which
the captures occurred in coastal waters, clarify that prize law also
applied to captures within the territory of a nation, meaning its
territorial and internal navigable waters. Thus, the true value of the
Court’s prize case decisions is more nuanced. Because prize cases
involved the use of war powers and invoked a special body of
international rules, the Court’s prize decisions contain important
insights about the rules of decision applicable to acts of belligerency by
the United States. Indeed, two of the most commonly referenced
Supreme Court decisions involving international law, Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy and Paquete Habana, are prize cases.
Three seminal cases speak volumes about the relationship of
international law to the Constitution and its separation of war powers.
First, consider Charming Betsy, 278 in which the Court held that a vessel
and cargo belonging to the citizen of a neutral state could not be seized
as prize, nor could authority to do so be implied from congressional
authorization to interdict trade between the U.S. and France. 279 The
main issue in the case was the status of the ship’s owner. United States
citizens sold the Charming Betsy to a U.S.-born Danish burgher who
filled it with American produce for trade with France. 280 A French
See supra text accompanying notes 161–74.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013) (citing Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993), as an example of the Court “declining to apply
a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to conduct occurring on the high seas”);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989) (declining to
apply a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in a case arising on high
seas).
277 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871).
278 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
279 Id. at 121. Under the law of nations, the property of nationals of neutral countries was
not subject to capture if engaged in international trade in ports not subject to blockade. Doing
so would have been considered an act of war against the neutral nation. See UPTON, supra note
162, at 259–77 (providing an overview of prize law).
280 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 115–16.
275
276

DEHN.37.6.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

CHOICE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

7/14/2016 5:22 PM

2137

privateer captured the ship, which was later captured by a U.S. warship
and brought to a U.S. court for prize adjudication as a U.S. vessel
engaged in prohibited commerce with France. 281
The Court found that the burgher was the true owner of the vessel,
and that he was properly considered a subject of Denmark, which was
neutral to the conflict between France and the United States. 282 It also
observed, “the building of vessels in the United States for sale to
neutrals, in the islands, is, during war, a profitable business, which
Congress cannot be intended to have prohibited, unless that intent be
manifested by express words or a very plain and necessary
implication.” 283 The Court then noted, “an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to
violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations.”284 Because the owner was a Danish
burgher, the Court concluded that he did not fall within the terms of the
statute prohibiting commercial intercourse, which was limited to
transactions between the French and “any person or persons, resident
within the United States or under their protection.”285 Therefore, neither
vessel nor cargo were subject to forfeiture. 286
The precise role of the law of nations in the Court’s decision can be
debated. One way to view the Court’s references to the law of nations is
merely as an aid to interpreting the scope of the federal statute at issue.
After all, the Court’s main goal was to determine whether the relevant
statue encompassed the seizure, and the case is generally cited as
demonstrating a canon of statutory interpretation. 287
Such a limited reading does not account for the actual result in the
case. By determining that the statute did not authorize the seizure, the
Court effectively applied customary international law regarding the
rights of neutrals. There was no controlling legislative act to displace
Id. at 116.
Id. at 120–21.
283 Id. at 118 (emphasis omitted).
284 Id.
285 Id. (emphasis omitted). The Court engaged in an interesting discussion of whether the
owner’s prior U.S. citizenship had been relinquished or whether, as a prior citizen, he was still
“under the protection” of the United States. Id. at 119–21.
286 Id. at 121.
287 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO.
L.J. 479, 488–91 (1998) (outlining various ways in which the Charming Betsy canon has been
used to avoid construing statutes as violating or permitting violation of various treaty and
customary international law obligations); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of
Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293 (2005).
281
282
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international neutrality law. 288 Applicable federal legislation established
a state of limited war, thereby displacing general admiralty law and
invoking prize law between the warring nations and neutrality law as to
uninvolved nations. The legislation was therefore “controlling” in this
sense. The Executive’s reasonable, but in the Court’s view, erroneous,
identification of the ship as subject to seizure and forfeiture, 289 however,
was not controlling upon the Court. Ultimately, in the terms of the
Paquete Habana framework, because there was no treaty, and no
constitutionally controlling legislative or executive act, the Court
applied the customs and usages of civilized nations protecting the rights
of neutrals as a rule of decision.
Moreover, Congress’s power to provide for the forfeiture of
American vessels and cargo engaged in prohibited commerce was not
questioned despite the Bill of Rights implications. Through the exercise
of its war powers, Congress could apparently divest U.S. residents and
citizens of their commercial property for public use, 290 free from the
constraints of the Compensation Clause. 291 As will be shown, the
inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to otherwise lawfully adopted war
measures is a recurring theme in the Court’s wartime jurisprudence.
In Little v. Barreme, decided in the same year as Charming Betsy,
the Court addressed a situation involving more limited hostilities with
France and resolved a different aspect of the choice-of-law framework
involving the Constitution’s separation of war powers between the
President and Congress. 292 To implement a general policy prohibiting
commercial intercourse with France, Congress authorized only the
seizure of American ships traveling to French ports. 293 Pursuant to
executive orders authorizing a broader range of seizures, a naval
commander seized and sought condemnation of a Danish ship,
288 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 119 (“If it was intended that any American vessel sold to a
neutral should, in the possession of that neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities
imposed on her while she belonged to citizens of the United States, such extraordinary intent
ought to have been plainly expressed . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
289 The Court went to great lengths to find that Captain Murray ought not to be held
personally liable for a marine trespass. Id. at 123–24 (“Although there does not appear to have
been such cause to suspect the Charming Betsy and her cargo to have been American, as would
justify captain Murray in bringing her in for adjudication, yet many other circumstances
combine with the fairness of his character to produce a conviction that he acted upon correct
motives, from a sense of duty; for which reason this hard case ought not to be rendered still
more so by a decision in any respect oppressive.”).
290 Recall the earlier discussion of prize law where proceeds from the sale of captured
property vested in the capturing state were also used to compensate ship owners and crew. See
supra notes 162–68 and accompanying text.
291 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
292 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
293 Id. at 177–78.

DEHN.37.6.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

CHOICE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

7/14/2016 5:22 PM

2139

suspected of being American, traveling from a French to a Danish
port. 294 Although Captain Little’s actions complied with his orders, they
clearly violated the statute. 295 For that reason alone, the Court found the
seizure unlawful. 296
In Little, however, the Court did not review the constitutional
power of Congress to enact either the substance or limited
implementing measures of its nonintercourse policy, despite a
conflicting executive order. Also absent is any hint of impropriety
surrounding Congress’s decision to limit the effect of this war measure
to American ships and cargo. Using its war powers, Congress’s
preferred policy and narrow means of implementation were controlling
on both the Court and the executive, and were, again, apparently not
limited by the Compensation Clause.
Finally, let us more fully consider Paquete Habana, which involved
two fishing vessels seized off the coast of Cuba and brought to Key West
for prize adjudication. 297 The trial court ruled that they were not exempt
from seizure as prize. 298 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding “[b]y an
ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and
gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels,
pursuing their vocation . . . have been recognized as exempt, with their
cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.” 299 Because the vessel
was exempt from capture “by the general consent of civilized nations,” it
could not “be condemned by a prize court, for want of a distinct
exemption in a treaty or other public act of the government.” 300
The Court indicated, however, that an act of government
authorizing capture might be an “act of Congress or order of the
President.” 301 Charming Betsy had already strongly implied that
Congress could authorize captures in violation of the rights of those
exempt from capture under the law of nations. Paquete Habana
confirms this view. Unfortunately, Paquete Habana was not clear
regarding the circumstances under which an order from the President
or any lower executive branch official might lawfully authorize conduct
inconsistent with the law of nations. Charming Betsy indicates that
congressional authorization may be needed.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179. The Court emphasized that the ship could not have been lawfully seized even if
it had been American, undoubtedly, because it was travelling from a French port rather than to
it. Id.
296 Id.
297 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678–79 (1900).
298 Id. at 679.
299 Id. at 686.
300 Id. at 711.
301 Id.
294
295
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Charming Betsy and Paquete Habana both clarify that the
customary law of nations provides a rule of decision in cases where it
applies, unless Congress or possibly the President clearly and expressly
indicate otherwise. We are left to wonder, however, whether the
President’s power to violate international law is equal, if subordinate, to
that of Congress. Little established that legislation prevails in the event
of plain and unavoidable conflict between a duly enacted statute and an
executive order. But these decisions simply do not clarify the full range
of potentially controlling executive acts.
For the sole purpose of providing examples of controlling executive
acts in war, two cases from the Civil War are helpful. The first is The
Prize Cases, arising from President Lincoln’s decision to blockade
Southern ports after the attack on Fort Sumter. 302 The main question
before the Supreme Court was whether the President had authority to
impose a blockade without a declaration of war from Congress.303
Finding that he did, 304 that the law of nations applies to a civil war, 305
and that the blockade conformed to international law, 306 the Court
applied international law to adjudicate the disposition of captured ships
and cargo. 307 Thus, these executive acts were controlling, but only to the
extent consistent with international law.
In his Hendren dissent, Justice Bradley provided other examples of
controlling executive acts. He stated, “in many things that prima facie
belong to international law, the government will adopt its own
regulations: such as the extent to which intercourse shall be prohibited;
how far property of enemies shall be confiscated; what shall be deemed
contraband.” 308 In other words, some executive war measures are placed
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640–42 (1862).
Id.
304 Id. at 668.
305 Id. at 667–68 (“When the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or
insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists and hostilities
may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign
enemies invading the land.”); see also The Venice, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258, 274 (1864) (“The rule
which declares that war makes all the citizens or subjects of one belligerent enemies of the
Government and of all the citizens or subjects of the other, applies equally to civil and to
international wars.” (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666, 687–88 (Nelson, J., dissenting))).
306 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.
307 Id. at 674–82.
308 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 288 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice
Bradley continued:
302
303

All this only shows that the laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in
regard to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at war are laws of
the United States. These laws will be the unwritten international law, if nothing be
adopted or announced to the contrary; or the express regulations of the government,
when it sees fit to make them. But in both cases it is the law of the United States for
the time being, whether written or unwritten.
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within the President’s discretion by acts of Congress and require the
courts to apply international law. Other executive war measures might
implement broad authorities of international law in specific ways. Either
could be a controlling executive act for purposes of the Paquete Habana
framework. Neither situation necessarily permits the President to violate
applicable international law. 309 Indeed, the Court’s review in The Prize
Cases echoes Charming Betsy, in that the Court reviewed both the
imposition and specific implementation of the blockade for compliance
with customary international law., This suggests the president may not
generally violate clearly established customary international law.
B.

The Law of War as a Rule of Decision in Foreign Territory
1.

A Preliminary Note About Foreign Territory

Before discussing cases in which the Court has addressed the
choice of law in armed conflict for cases arising within foreign territory,
this Section will first clarify the point at which the Court believes foreign
territory held or occupied by U.S. military forces becomes U.S.
territory—the main issue in Fleming v. Page. 310 Fleming involved a duty
imposed on goods from the port of Tampico, a Mexican port under U.S.
military occupation as the result of a congressionally declared war with
Mexico. 311 The issue was whether Tampico was still properly considered
a foreign port, and whether the goods were therefore “foreign goods”
subject to the duty. 312
In deciding that Tampico was still foreign territory, the Court
noted that a declaration of war should not be understood to “imply an
authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by

Id. (emphasis added). While this might be read to support the view that international law is
federal law, it is clear Justice Bradley is expressing the idea that international law is law for the
courts and that because war is a federal function, the Court should find federal jurisdiction in
such cases, likely from the act authorizing hostilities, when present. That is why it is U.S. law
only “for the time being.” Id.
309 Controlling executive acts could include battlefield “reprisal” powers, meaning acts that
might otherwise violate international laws of war but were permitted under specific
circumstances to repress and punish an enemy violation. Originally a form of collective
punishment in a wide variety of contexts, they are mostly prohibited by contemporary
customary and conventional international humanitarian law. See generally FRITS KALSHOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (2d ed. 2005). In the United States, prominent scholars called this
“retaliation.” See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 796–98 (2d ed. 1920).
Because not addressed by the Court, the topic will require separate analysis.
310 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
311 Id. at 614.
312 Id.
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subjugating the enemy’s country.” 313 It continued, “this can be done
only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority, and is not a
part of the power conferred upon the President by [a] declaration of
war.” 314 Although the President “may invade the hostile country, and
subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States[,] . . . his
conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the
operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to
them by the legislative power.” 315 Thus, the mere presence of the U.S.
military, even as an occupier, does not extend the full measure of the
Constitution and laws of the United States to that territory. The Court’s
approach on this point was consistent in later cases involving the
temporary military occupation of Cuba 316 as well as the military
occupations of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. 317
2.

War with Mexico and Beyond

In Jecker v. Montgomery, the Court addressed a different way in
which the Constitution limits the belligerent acts of the Executive in
foreign territory. 318 Jecker involved the constitutional status of military
prize courts established, along with other military tribunals trying both
common law crimes and offenses against the laws of war, 319 in occupied
Mexico. The Court first clarified that prize captures “are for the benefit
of the sovereign under whose authority they are made; and the validity
of the seizure and the question of prize or no prize can be determined in
his own courts only, upon which he has conferred jurisdiction to try the
question.” 320 After the Court held that jurisdiction over prize cases was
vested by the Constitution and laws of the United States in Article III
courts, 321 it distinguished the prize courts from other military tribunals
in Mexico.

Id.
Id. at 615.
315 Id. (emphasis added).
316 See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
317 See The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176, 178 (1901) (holding that the Philippines are no
longer foreign territory after being ceded to the United States by treaty); De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901) (reaching same result as to Puerto Rico). This approach also squares with the
Court’s approach to unincorporated territories. See supra note 233.
318 Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1851).
319 WINTHROP, supra note 309 at 832–33 (tracing origins and practice of punishing law-ofwar violations, including military commissions and councils of war in Mexico). The court at
issue was established at Monterey, California, by the commander of American forces acting as
governor of the territory. Jecker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 512.
320 Jecker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 515.
321 Id.
313
314
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The courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by
the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than the
agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the
conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons
and property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were
subject to the military power, and their decisions under its control,
whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They
were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate
upon a question of prize or no prize. 322

Although these military tribunals could not adjudicate matters
dedicated to the national courts by the Constitution and federal statute,
the Court appeared to have no concern regarding their ability to punish
common law crimes and law-of-war violations in occupied foreign
territory. The ability to establish such tribunals remains an aspect of
international laws of war to this day. 323 The Court, albeit in dictum,
appears to have distinguished and approved of these tribunals as a
permissible exercise of the nation’s war powers when consistent with
international laws of war. This implies that the law of nations marks the
outer limits of permissible executive discretion in war.
Note that these military tribunals were also not limited in any other
respect by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Composed of
military officers and applying procedural rules from the Articles of War
by analogy, 324 military tribunals imposed punishment without observing
constitutional protections applicable in Article III federal courts.
Although this may seem unobjectionable on the ground that those

Id.
For example, under Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 12, art. 64, such a tribunal may apply the “penal laws of the occupied
territory,” which “shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or
suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an
obstacle to the application of the present Convention.” An occupier may also adopt new
security measures so long it announces them in the language of the inhabitants, and may then
“hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts,” in the case of
the United States, military commissions, to adjudicate violations. Id. art. 65–66. Individual
civilians may also be punished by an occupying army for violations of the laws and customs of
war committed before occupation by a hostile army. Id. art. 70.
324 Because applied by analogy, violations of these rules did not necessarily invalidate a
conviction. WINTHROP, supra note 309, at 841 (“In the absence of any statute or regulation
governing the proceedings of military commissions, the same are commonly conducted
according to the rules and forms governing courts-martial . . . are indeed more summary in
their action than are the courts held under the Articles of war . . . their proceedings . . . will not
be rendered illegal by the omission of details required upon trials by courts-martial . . . .”). But
see David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J.
INT’L L. 5, 41–42 (2005) (noting a “practice of close conformance to court-martial
procedures”).
322
323
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punished were foreigners in foreign land, 325 the tribunals punished
crimes both by and against U.S. persons. 326 The Supreme Court later
held that military commissions are exempt from any jury trial
requirement, even when punishing U.S. citizens. 327
The Court’s approach to international law and the Constitution
remained consistent when adjudicating various aspects of the military
occupation of Mexican lands. In Cross v. Harrison, the Court upheld a
port tax at San Francisco imposed by U.S. military authorities occupying
“all of Upper California” after ousting the Mexican government. 328 It did
so because it found the tax to be within the belligerent rights of a
conqueror and authorized by the “constitutional commander-in-chief,”
even though Congress “had not passed an act to extend the collection of
tonnage and import duties to the ports of California.” 329 Similarly, in
Leitensdorfer v. Webb, the Court upheld the executive’s occupation laws
and courts in New Mexico until “revoked or modified . . . either by
direct legislation on the part of Congress, or by that of the Territorial
Government in the exercise of powers delegated by Congress,” in part
because doing so was consistent with the law of nations. 330
Many insights regarding the Paquete Habana framework and
potentially relevant aspects of the Constitution are evident in these
cases. First, in each, a rule of decision affecting the outcome was either
an applicable legislative act or constitutional provision (Fleming and
Jecker) or the customary international law (all others). The various
executive acts were not upheld as “controlling executive . . . act[s]” that
might supersede applicable customs and usages of civilized nations, as
suggested in Paquete Habana. 331 They were upheld in each case because
they were found to be consistent with customary international law.
Furthermore, the Court upheld many executive acts without affirmative
and specific legislative authority or delegation and notwithstanding
their constitutional commitment to other branches of the government
in domestic matters. And finally, permissible measures adopted during
war or occupation were not constrained by Bill of Rights provisions
otherwise applicable to similar acts of domestic governance. This was

325 Erika Myers, Conquering Peace: Military Commissions as a Lawfare Strategy in the
Mexican War, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 212 (2008).
326 Glazier, supra note 324, at 33.
327 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
328 Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 189–90 (1853).
329 Id.
330 Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177–78 (1857).
331 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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even true of military tribunals imposing criminal punishment because
“[t]hey were not courts of the United States.” 332
3.

The Second World War

In its scant opportunities to review cases arising in foreign territory
during the Second World War, the Supreme Court adhered to this
choice of law approach. One case worth noting, however, is Hirota v.
MacArthur, in which the Court held in a brief, per curiam opinion that
“courts of the United States have no power or authority to review, to
affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences” by the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East because it was not “a
tribunal of the United States” even though convened by General
MacArthur pursuant to international agreements. 333 Without
jurisdiction, the Court had no occasion to determine the rule of
decision. Had it done so, however, Hirota may have provided an
example in which a (non-self-executing) treaty provided the rule of
decision.
In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court held that German nationals
convicted by a military tribunal and detained in occupied Germany had
no right to seek writs of habeas corpus in U.S. courts. 334 Although the
Court disclaimed jurisdiction, it did so in part on a law-of-nations basis,
noting, “our law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized
throughout the civilized world . . . between aliens of friendly and of
enemy allegiance.” 335 Even though the decision addressed a foreign
affairs matter and relied in part on the law of nations, it dealt with the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts created by Congress. Therefore, this case is
best viewed as a decision in which the Court created federal common
law from the law of nations and the Constitution’s allocation of powers.
In Madsen v. Kinsella, the Court upheld the conviction of a civilian
spouse by a U.S. military commission applying German penal law in
occupied Germany. 336 After finding that Congress had preserved the
jurisdiction of such tribunals in the Articles of War, 337 the Court noted,
332 Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851). There are also cases in which
the authority of military tribunals in conquered territories was upheld even after the
establishment of peace, the acquisition of the land by treaty, and the establishment of an
incomplete insular government. See, e.g., Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909) (upholding
the decision of the provisional court established by military authority in conquered territory
with the approval of the President until legislatively changed).
333 Hirota v. Gen. of the Army MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam).
334 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768–77 (1950).
335 Id. at 769.
336 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361–62 (1952).
337 Id. at 351–55.
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“[t]he authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire upon
cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace. It
may continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge
its responsibilities fully.” 338 Thus, this use of war powers was consistent
with the law of nations and justified the use of a U.S. military tribunal to
try a civilian U.S. citizen without providing Bill of Rights protections
applicable in U.S. criminal prosecutions.
Contrast Madsen with Reid v. Covert, decided only a few years
later, in which the Court held that the armed forces could not
constitutionally exercise court-martial jurisdiction over civilian spouses
accused of murder while residing abroad with their military spouses in a
time of peace. 339 Although agreements with the host nations and the text
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provided for U.S. military
jurisdiction in both cases, the Court held “[i]t would be manifestly
contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well
as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights . . . to construe
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international
agreement
without
observing
constitutional
prohibitions.” 340 However, it distinguished the convictions at issue in
Reid from those in which civilians “performing services for the armed
forces ‘in the field’ during time of war” were prosecuted by military
tribunals, concluding, “they must rest on the Government’s ‘war
powers.’” 341 Reid is therefore properly understood as a case involving an
extraterritorial exercise of internal sovereign powers over U.S. citizens
abroad. It does not undermine or overturn earlier decisions upholding
the use of military tribunals to try civilian U.S. citizens pursuant to a
proper exercise of the nation’s war powers against foreign entities or in
foreign territory.
C.

The Law of War as an “External” Rule of Decision in U.S.
Territories

Given the fortuitous fact that most of the belligerent acts associated
with our nation’s armed conflicts with foreign entities have not
occurred within incorporated U.S. territory, there are few Supreme
Court cases through which to examine the domestic application of the
Paquete Habana choice-of-law framework. For theoretical clarity,
except for the points raised earlier regarding controlling executive acts,
Id. at 360.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This was a consolidated rehearing of two cases the
Court originally found constitutionally sufficient. See Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
340 Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.
341 Id. at 33.
338
339
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the Civil War case law must be analyzed separately even though the
Supreme Court clearly held that the customary law of nations applied to
that war. 342 The most salient non–Civil War examples are Brown v.
United States 343 and Ex parte Quirin, 344 neither of which exemplify clear
judicial reasoning.
Also potentially relevant is In re Yamashita, 345 although it is not
entirely clear from that decision whether the congressionally established
territorial government of the Philippines had been fully restored after
the ouster of Japanese forces. The case could potentially be equated to
those in which the Court allowed the continued use of military tribunals
in occupied territory until a territorial government exercised similar
powers. 346 In Johnson v. Eisentrager, however, the Court stated that “[b]y
reason of our sovereignty at that time over these insular possessions,
Yamashita stood much as did Quirin before American courts.” 347 The
Court continued, “Yamashita’s offenses were committed on our
territory, he was tried within the jurisdiction of our insular courts and
he was imprisoned within territory of the United States.” 348 Although
the Court was addressing access to U.S. courts to pursue a writ of habeas
corpus, Yamashita seems an apt precedent since it arose in a U.S.
territory with a congressionally established government. These cases
establish that in cases involving only an exercise of war powers within
U.S. territory against a foreign enemy the Court followed the Paquete
Habana “external sovereignty” choice-of-law framework.
Brown involved timber belonging to a British company seized by a
district attorney on his own initiative shortly after Congress declared
war on Great Britain in 1812. 349 After the District Court dismissed the
case, the Circuit Court reversed and condemned the timber as enemy
property forfeited to the United States. 350 The Supreme Court reversed
342 The Supreme Court held that in a Civil War, “the belligerent party who claims to be
sovereign, may exercise both belligerent and sovereign rights.” The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 673 (1862); see also 3 VATTEL, supra note 83, at §§ 292–94 (stating applicability of
law of war to parties in civil war). It might be more appropriate to characterize the Civil War as
adopting the international law of war as domestic common law because it was internal armed
conflict. See Dehn, supra note 274, at 73–79 (arguing that this was Winthrop’s approach in his
1886 and 1920 treatises).
343 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
344 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
345 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946).
346 Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909) (upholding validity of military provisional
courts in Puerto Rico pending creation of territorial government); see also Leitensdorfer v.
Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 176–83 (1857).
347 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 780 (1950).
348 Id.
349 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 121–22 (1814). Although the property
had been sold to an American citizen, the Court assumed the sale did not change the status of
the property for purposes of its analysis. Id. at 122.
350 Id. at 122.
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the Circuit Court, relying on the law of nations. After a cursory review
of contemporary treaty practice, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[t]he
modern rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to
an enemy and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought
not to be immediately confiscated.”351 Given this new international
custom, and Congress’s yet unexercised power to make rules for
captures, 352 Marshall found the condemnation improper without
statutory authorization. 353 In other words, without a “controlling
legislative act,” the customary law of nations provided the relevant rule
of decision.
Some claim that Brown establishes the quite different proposition
that the President may not exercise war powers domestically without
express congressional authorization. 354 Marshall noted, however, that it
did “not appear that this seizure was made under any instructions from
the president of the United States; nor is there any evidence of its having
his sanction, unless the libels being filed and prosecuted by the law
officer who represents the government, must imply that sanction.”355
Thus, the question of whether express presidential authorization would
have been a constitutionally controlling executive act was not addressed.
Interestingly, the Paquete Habana Court noted these aspects of the
Brown opinion in its discussion, 356 not only confirming the analysis
provided here, 357 but also potentially indicating that express presidential
351 Id. at 125 (emphasis added). Marshall equated the confiscation of property to the
confiscation of debts, which he believed had become obsolete. Id. at 123–24.
352 Marshall also believed that certain acts of Congress were contrary to implied executive
authority to immediately seize commercial property. Id. at 126–27. In addition, Marshall was
concerned that the case involved the divestment of private property rights rather than war
measures against enemy forces. Id. 125–26.
353 Id. at 125–29.
354 See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 242 (1990) (stating that the
Brown Court held that the President lacked power to seize plaintiff’s property without
congressional authorization); RAMSEY, supra note 32, at 249 (“Marshall concluded that the
President could not seize an enemy alien’s property in the United States without Congress’s
authorization, even in support of a formally declared war.”); Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 72
(asserting that Brown “reserved to Congress the power to create or escalate foreign conflict by
engaging in an act that the law of nations permitted”).
355 Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 121–22.
356 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 710–11 (1900).
357 Justice Story’s dissent also supports this interpretation of Justice Marshall’s opinion.
According to Story, the declaration of war authorized the President to wage war permitted by
the laws of war, in the absence of congressional indication to the contrary, “against the vessels,
goods and effects of the British government and its subjects; and to use the whole land and
naval force of the United States to carry the war into effect.” Brown, 12 U.S. at 135–47. Story
had no doubt regarding the ability to seize enemy commercial property immediately upon the
outbreak of hostilities. Id. at 143 (“In respect to the goods of an enemy found within the
dominions of a belligerent power, the right of confiscation is most amply admitted by Grotius,
and Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek, and Burlamaqui, and Rutherforth and Vattel.” (emphasis
added)). He agreed with Marshall that debts could no longer be confiscated without specific
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authorization might have qualified as a controlling executive act.
Nevertheless, the Court observed an emergent customary international
norm established by state practice as a rule of decision.
Ex parte Quirin upheld convictions of enemy soldiers by a
presidentially ordered military commission even though, unlike all
other cases involving military tribunals discussed to this point, the
tribunals were convened in peaceful, fully incorporated U.S. territory
where nonmilitary courts were available. In reaching its decision, the
Court relied upon customary international law, specific congressional
authorization for the use of military commissions, and the President’s
commander-in-chief powers.
Regarding the content of customary international law, the Court
stated, “[a]n important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military command . . . to seize and subject to
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the law of war.” 358 Additionally,
the Court found that by the reference to “offenders or offenses
that . . . by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions”
in the Fifteenth Article of War, Congress had expressly authorized
military tribunals and incorporated all law of war violations which were
included within their jurisdiction. 359 Curiously, however, the Court
found this statute to be an exercise of the Offenses Clause power rather
than only an exercise of Congress’s war powers, or a congressional
preservation of war powers that the Executive may independently
exercise when consistent with the laws of war. 360 By the Court’s
reasoning, the only essential question remaining was whether the
defendants had been charged with, and convicted of, offenses against
the laws of war. 361 Finding that they had been, the Court denied relief,
even for a U.S. citizen, Herman Haupt. 362
Quirin has been criticized, and in some respects this is proper, but
not for the reasons often cited. 363 The proper criticisms are twofold.
statutory authority. Id. at 145–46 (noting that debt confiscation “so justly deemed odious in
modern times, and is so generally discountenanced, that nothing but an express act of congress
would satisfy my mind that it ought to be included among the fair objects of warfare”). Thus,
even Story held a positivist view regarding how the law of war might change.
358 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942).
359 Id. at 30 (quoting Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. § 1486 (1940) (Article 15) (alteration in
original)).
360 Id. at 28 (“Congress . . . has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of
military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of
the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”).
361 Id.
362 Id. at 45–48.
363 “Justices who decided the case have not spoken kindly about Quirin. Frankfurter called it
‘not a happy precedent.’ Douglas wrote that ‘it was unfortunate the Court took the case.’ Chief
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First, reading the Fifteenth Article of War as affirmative statutory
authorization for military commissions is pure sophism. In full, that
article provided that
[t]he provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts
martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals. 364

This language quite clearly exempts and preserves jurisdiction that
Congress believes already exists. Preserving jurisdiction and
affirmatively “providing for the trial of such offenses” 365 are obviously
two very different things. The source of that jurisdiction cannot be the
statute. It must lie in the Executive’s war powers and international law.
This leads to the second criticism, the Court’s invocation of the
Offenses Clause. If punishing law-of-war violations by the enemy is a
fundamental incident of war, as the Court said, then the Offenses Clause
added nothing to it. As the earlier discussions of Jecker and Madsen
indicate, the Executive may establish law of war military commissions
and occupation tribunals using war powers. 366 These commissions are
therefore properly considered a war measure, an act of belligerency
based in the war powers of government and regulated only by the law of
war and any specifically relevant acts of Congress or the Executive. As
the Court recognized, Congress has “the choice of crystallizing in
permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of
war.” 367 It also held that the Constitution does not require a jury trial for
Justice Stone described the process of drafting the final opinion as a ‘mortification of the flesh.’”
Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin,
the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 156 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see Chad
DeVeaux, Rationalizing the Constitution: The Military Commissions Act and the Dubious
Legacy of Ex Parte Quirin, 42 AKRON L. REV. 13, 17–18 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s opinion
in Quirin is in “plain tension with [the] Ex parte Milligan” case and that the Quirin case
“radically extended military-commission jurisdiction to include certain offenses that violate the
‘law of war’”); see also Sarah Erickson-Muschko, Note, Beyond Individual Status: The Clear
Statement Rule and the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United States, 101 GEO.
L.J. 1399, 1416–18 (2013) (arguing that Quirin has limited application as a result of its factbased analysis and the short period of time in which the opinion was written).
364 10 U.S.C. § 1486 (1940).
365 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
366 WINTHROP, supra note 309, at 831–33 (tracing origins and practice of military
commissions punishing law-of-war violations); John M. Bickers, Military Commissions Are
Constitutionally Sound: A Response to Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 899,
908–10 (2003) (identifying “law of war military commissions” as one of three types of military
commissions); Glazier, supra note 324, at 9 (listing “trying law of war violations” as one of four
historical purposes of military commissions).
367 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30.
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war crimes, 368 although it may require that only actual law-of-war
violations be punished, at least within U.S. territory where Article III
courts necessarily have jurisdiction over other offenses. 369 In
extraterritorial matters unrelated to internal governance, the Mexican
War and postwar Germany examples clarify that the jurisdiction of
military commissions is not limited to law-of-war violations identified
as such by international law. 370
In re Yamashita 371 is similar in many respects. Relying heavily on
its analysis in Quirin, the court found a military commission convened
in the Philippines had lawfully tried and convicted General Yamashita
of war crimes. 372 Additionally, however, the Court specifically addressed
the temporal jurisdiction of military commissions, concluding that,
under the law of nations, such commissions could be conducted after
hostilities end but before formal peace is established. 373 The Court then
suggested, as it had in Madsen, that military commission jurisdiction
could even extend beyond a treaty of armistice or peace. 374 On this issue,
then, the Court identified the general customary law of nations or a
specific treaty as a potential rule of decision regarding the temporal
jurisdiction of military commissions, just as the Paquete Habana
framework would require. This rationale also reaffirms that military
commissions are an exercise of external sovereign powers, although
extending their use beyond a formal peace arrangement might require
viewing them as an exercise of general foreign affairs rather than war
powers.
Contrast these cases with those involving the adoption of domestic
measures applicable to American citizens and resident aliens. In
Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld the conviction of a
Japanese-American citizen for violating an exclusion order. 375 The
Court did not refer to the law of war to support the order, but rather
368 Id. at 29 (“These petitioners were charged with an offense against the law of war which
the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.”).
369 But see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295 (2010) (arguing several constitutional
constraints apply to military commissions and therefore require jurisdiction to be limited to
law-of-war violations).
370 See supra Section IV.B.2–3.
371 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
372 Id. at 7–9, 20.
373 Id. at 12 (“No writer on international law appears to have regarded the power of military
tribunals, otherwise competent to try violations of the law of war, as terminating before the
formal state of war has ended.”).
374 Id. at 13 (“The extent to which the power to prosecute violations of the law of war shall
be exercised before peace is declared rests, not with the courts, but with the political branch of
the Government, and may itself be governed by the terms of an armistice or the treaty of
peace.”).
375 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
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treated it as a case of extreme public necessity justifying a temporary
abridgement of the rights of those affected by it. 376 For identical reasons,
the Court upheld the conviction of a Japanese-American citizen for
violation of a curfew order in Hirabayashi v. United States. 377
Conversely, in Ex parte Kawato, the Court allowed a Japanese-born
resident alien to bring an admiralty suit in U.S. courts despite the
defendant’s claim that he was an enemy national who should be denied
access to the court. 378 In these and similar cases involving purely internal
or domestic matters incident to war, the Court did not find
international law or the Paquete Habana framework to be relevant.
This Part has demonstrated that in cases arising from wars with
foreign nations or entities, international law has been an exogenous rule
of decision in our courts when applicable. How, then, does one
distinguish between cases involving internal sovereignty and those
involving external sovereignty? How does one determine whether
customary international law is used to create federal common law (and
therefore subject to greater constitutional constraints) or whether it is
an independent rule of decision related only to the exercise of external
sovereign powers and specific constitutional provisions applicable
thereto?
The answer seems to lie in the role of a rule of decision in
governance. The case law is clear that the particular location where a
case arises has been a factor in determining whether a rule of decision is
properly considered domestic or international. It is not dispositive.
Thus, if a case involves domestic or “internal” powers of governance,
including the government’s relationship with its citizens in times of
peace, then it is a matter domestic or internal governance, and any rule
of decision must conform to the Bill of Rights. If the rule of decision
pertains to a clear exercise of external sovereignty involving a foreign
entity, including an exercise of the war powers, then international law
serves as an exogenous rule of decision, similar to foreign law. The Part
has demonstrated that international laws regulating the exercise of acts
of belligerency during wars with foreign entities are of the latter type,
even in cases arising within U.S. territory.
376 Id. (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under
circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental
institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.”).
377 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) (“The adoption by Government, in
the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon the
recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction
may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution
and is not to be condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances racial
distinctions are irrelevant.”).
378 Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942).
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PAQUETE HABANA FRAMEWORK
The implications of the preceding analysis are potentially both
significant and far-reaching. This Part briefly surveys a few of the
potential contributions of this Article’s normative claims and
descriptive analysis to various issues surrounding the use of the law of
war as a rule of decision in federal courts.
A.

Implications of the Normative Claim

Recall that the normative claim is that customary international law
is positivist and exogenous to the Constitution and laws of the United
States. It is neither an adopted or inherent part of federal law, nor is it
necessarily incorporated into federal law by its use as a rule of decision.
As law in part made by and binding upon the United States, a proper
exercise of the “judicial power of the United States” requires U.S. courts
to follow international law to which the U.S. clearly consents in cases
where it applies. These conclusions, if accepted, clarify the role of
Paquete Habana and Charming Betsy.
Recognizing that international law is exogenous but nevertheless
applicable law in appropriate cases clarifies the doctrinal role of the
general principles announced in Paquete Habana and Charming Betsy.
In matters of external sovereignty, the Charming Betsy doctrine is not
merely a canon of statutory interpretation; it is an aid in the choice of
law framework articulated in Paquete Habana. If a federal statute can be
interpreted to be consistent with applicable international law, it will be.
International law will then provide the rule of decision, as occurred in
Charming Betsy. If an applicable federal statute is inconsistent with
international law, any statute that is later in time than an applicable
treaty or general rule of customary international law provides the rule of
decision 379 and is therefore a controlling legislative act under the
Paquete Habana framework.
Cases involving internal governance are more complicated. It is not
clear whether customary international law can provide an independent
rule of decision in any matters of true domestic governance. The
379 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193–94 (1888) (finding that an act of Congress
prevails over a prior treaty if the two are in conflict); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
616, 621 (1870); see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between
Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1091–99 (1985) (citing federalist
literature and other historical events in the nation’s founding in support of an argument against
the later-in-time rule). But see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time
Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005) (providing a defense of the last-intime rule on historical, constitutional, and functional grounds).
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original Alien Tort Statute implicitly assumes that both treaties and
customary international law provide a conduct-regulating rule of
decision for which federal or state courts may provide a domestic,
common law cause of action and remedy. 380 This could imply customary
international law is intrinsically applicable throughout the territory of
the United States without being federal common law.
However, the Rules of Decision Act also becomes relevant when
discussing internal U.S. sovereignty. As previously shown, there are
certainly times when federal courts create federal common law by
observing the separation of powers and related international law. 381
Federal courts must also observe and preserve federalism principles in
foreign affairs. 382 Given that foreign affairs powers are reserved to the
federal government and in most respects denied to the states, 383 federal
courts must independently determine the content and proper
interpretation of traditional international law when a case implicates
foreign affairs. 384 This is particularly true in matters involving war with
foreign nations or entities, over which the Constitution denies power to
the states. 385 For example, in Hendren, the Court concluded that that no
federal question was raised when a New York life insurance company
refused payment for the death of a policyholder in Virginia during the
Civil War. 386 Should a case involve a similar claim by a foreign plaintiff
related to an international or noninternational armed conflict with a
foreign entity, it would likely fall within the scope of foreign diversity
jurisdiction and the result should likely be different. 387 In cases where
the Constitution’s assignment of foreign affairs powers to the federal
government are truly implicated, or in which there is a relevant
congressional or executive act, the courts might also find a federal
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
See supra Section III.C.
382 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) (“[T]he likelihood that state
legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign
policy of the National Government would require preemption of the state law.”); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (“[R]egulations must give way if they impair the effective
exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy”); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign
Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1620–21 (1997) (“Federal courts charged with
enforcing structural constitutional guarantees must invalidate state laws or acts that
impermissibly impinge upon the unique federal foreign relations interest and, when necessary,
replace them with judge-made rules. Otherwise, parochial state acts could threaten the foreign
relations interests, and perhaps the national security, of the entire nation—a situation the
Constitution is plainly designed to avoid.”).
383 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
384 Miller, 389 U.S. at 441 (noting state laws that “conflict with a treaty . . . must bow to the
superior federal policy”). A similar argument could be made for state laws that conflict with
customary international norms with which the United States clearly agrees.
385 Id.
386 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1875).
387 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
380
381
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question, which might be based upon a declaration of war or other
authorization for the use of military force. 388 In other words, even
though traditional international law is not federal law, this does not
defeat federal jurisdiction in many—if not most—cases in which it must
be interpreted and applied.
B.

Implications of the Descriptive Analysis

A proper understanding and application of the Paquete Habana
framework will also aid federal courts in properly resolving matters
currently pending before them. One question percolating in the D.C.
Circuit, and likely on its way to the Supreme Court, involves the subject
matter jurisdiction of military commissions convened at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. 389 The central issue is whether Congress properly placed
certain offenses in the Military Commissions Act (MCA) within the
jurisdiction of law of war military commissions rather than Article III
courts. No court has yet considered the Paquete Habana framework,
nor have they thoroughly examined the origins and precise nature of the
constitutional powers at issue.
Most recently, a D.C. Circuit panel held that giving military
commissions jurisdiction over inchoate conspiracy impermissibly
encroached upon the jurisdiction of Article III courts. 390 This
conclusion is suspect. Because most of the conduct being tried by MCA
military commissions occurred overseas, and, at least arguably within
the context of an armed conflict with a foreign entity, Fleming, Quirin,
Madsen, and Yamashita all indicate that the jurisdiction of Article III
courts do not necessarily have constitutional primacy. 391 They also
strongly indicate the use of military commissions is an exercise of the
war powers. This suggests that a different constitutional analysis, one
based in the Paquete Habana framework, is appropriate.
The panel began its constitutional analysis emphasizing that Article
III vests the judicial power, including the power of criminal
punishment, in federal courts. It cited Ex parte Milligan 392 and Quirin,
and several cases not involving a war or armed conflict, for the
388 See, e.g., Hendren, 92 U.S. at 287 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“When a citizen of the United
States claims exemption from the ordinary obligations of a contract by reason of the existence
of a war between his government and that of the other parties to it, the claim is made under the
laws of the United States by which trade and intercourse with the enemy are forbidden.”).
389 Al-Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 25, 2015) (order granting petition for rehearing en banc).
390 Id. at 22.
391 See supra Sections IV.B.2–C.
392 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
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proposition that military commissions are narrow exceptions to the
jurisdiction of Article III courts. 393 While this claim is likely true in
peaceful U.S. territory, where the conduct punished in Milligan and
Quirin occurred, it is a more doubtful proposition when the conduct
being prosecuted and punished was engaged in by a member of a
foreign armed group and occurred extraterritorially in the course of an
armed conflict, such as in occupied Mexico.
The panel then focused on whether conspiracy was an offense
under international laws of war or otherwise triable by military
commission. 394 It claimed that Quirin limited Congress to punishing
only actual international law-of-war violations. 395 The Quirin Court,
however, decided whether the President had properly exercised what it
found to be congressionally delegated power to punish law-of-war
violations within U.S. territory. 396 Its focus on whether the Executive
had properly tried actual law-of-war violations was therefore
appropriate. The military commissions convened pursuant to the MCA,
however, are adjudicating offenses prescribed by Congress and applied
to extraterritorial conduct. Under the Paquete Habana framework, if an
offense Congress defines in the MCA is inconsistent with an earlier-intime treaty or customary law of war norm, then the MCA is potentially a
controlling legislative act. As the court said in Brown, a rule of
customary international law is “not . . . immutable . . . but depends on
political considerations which may continually vary.” 397 It “is addressed
to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded
by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.” 398 Thus, the
appropriate inquiry is the scope of Congress’s constitutional power to
adopt war measures punishing the enemy, an inquiry that should
respect the different role of Article III courts in extraterritorial and
foreign affairs. 399
At bottom, determining the proper rule of decision for any given
case requires careful constitutional analysis of the particular sovereign
powers being exercised and their allocation among the branches of the
federal government. As the descriptive analysis demonstrated, the Court
intuitively followed the Paquete Habana framework in its wartime
jurisprudence even prior to its articulation in that case. If that
framework were revived to its proper place of importance, many
Al-Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 7–10.
Id. at 10–11.
395 Id. at 14–17.
396 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–48 (1942).
397 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
398 Id.
399 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (discussing the political question doctrine and its
application to matters of foreign affairs).
393
394
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lingering questions over the separation of war powers would be
addressed by the courts instead of by the Office of Legal Counsel in
unpublished advice to the President. Judicial abstinence from the
process of enforcing the separation of war and other foreign affairs
powers has long favored executive overreach. 400
C.

The Relationship of Customary to Treaty-Based Laws of War

The Paquete Habana framework also clarifies the relationship
between customary international and treaty-based laws of war.
Assuming for the sake of argument that only self-executing law of war
treaties are enforceable in the federal courts, 401 treaties are only one
possible rule of decision under the Paquete Habana framework. In the
absence of an enforceable treaty, or a controlling executive or legislative
act, the courts must look to customary international law for potential
rules of decision. The courts might then squarely engage questions
regarding the proper methodology for determining the content of
contemporary customary international law, the Executive’s role in
creating (or preventing the creation of) customary law binding upon the
United States, and other important questions that would benefit from
objective judicial analysis.

400

As Professor Koh astutely observed:

The broader lesson that emerges from this study of executive initiative, congressional
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance . . . is that under virtually every scenario the
president wins. If the executive branch possesses statutory or constitutional authority
to act and Congress acquiesces, the president wins. If Congress does not acquiesce in
the president’s act, but lacks the political will either to cut off appropriations or to
pass an objecting statute and override a veto, the president again wins. If a member
of Congress or a private individual sues to challenge the president’s action, the
judiciary will likely refuse to hear that challenge on the ground that the plaintiff lacks
standing; the defendant is immune; the question is political, not ripe, or moot; or that
relief is inappropriate.
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 148 (1990).
401 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (order denying petition for
rehearing en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[I]t is for Congress and the President—not
the courts—to determine in the first instance whether and how the United States will meet its
international obligations” and courts must respect a decision “not to incorporate internationallaw norms into domestic U.S. law.”); id. at 16 (“[I]nternational-law principles found in nonself-executing treaties and customary international law, but not incorporated into statutes or
self-executing treaties, are not part of domestic U.S. law.”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has reexamined first principles to clarify the
relationship of “traditional” customary international law generally, and
of customary international laws of war specifically, to the U.S.
Constitution, laws, and legal system. Much of the current debate lacks
nuance. Mainstream points of view often refer to specific data points
that are ambiguous in nature, and assert that they are certain, even
canonical. 402 Theories are then constructed and applied both forward
and backward in an attempt to demonstrate their validity and to
account for inconsistent data. By returning to first principles in order to
carefully distill the Framers’, First Congress’s, and Supreme Court’s
fairly consistent understanding of this relationship, this Article’s
normative claim and descriptive analysis potentially provide some
coherence to an area of the law that is, at present, hopelessly cluttered
with ambiguous and competing theories.
Whatever one thinks of the jurisprudential legitimacy of
considering customary international law to be positivist, enacted law
rather than a theoretical general law, it was clearly understood to be
positivist, exogenous law by the Supreme Court (its approach to
interstitial gap-filling notwithstanding), by the international jurists most
influential upon the founding generation, and by early American
commentators. This knowledge, coupled with the understanding that
traditional customary international law binds an entire nation,
including all of its institutions and citizens, clarifies that describing
customary international law to be “law of the land” 403 or “part of our
law” does not transform its fundamental nature as law exogenous to the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Such phrases merely express
an understanding that customary international law is law for the United
States and its citizens, not of the United States.
Difficult questions remain regarding the proper judicial approach
to identifying binding customary norms and the extent to which the
Executive participates in making or preventing the ripening of a rule of
customary international law for the United States. Resolving such
questions could be enhanced by the objective participation of courts.
Raising the Paquete Habana framework from the depths of history to a
402 See Vázquez, supra note 36, at 1516 (“The canonical expression of the modern position is
the statement in The Paquete Habana that ‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.’” (footnote
omitted) (alteration in original)).
403 An oft-cited reference to customary international law as “law of the land” is Who
Privileged from Arrest, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26 (1792) (“The law of nations, although not specially
adopted by the Constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land.”).
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prominent place in contemporary wartime jurisprudence could do
much to help clarify these issues.
America once had a leading role in establishing and maintaining
the rule of international law. By again recognizing that international law
provides a rule of decision to be applied by the courts of this country in
appropriate cases, we might start to regain what has been lost by elected
officials, judges, and government legal advisors making policy-oriented
arguments regarding the substance of customary international laws of
war and the constitutional propriety of observing them.

